


January 1951

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# COMBAT FORCES


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COVER: Maxim M1910 Machine Gun, Caliber 7.62mm, Captured in Korea (Department of Defense photo)

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# YOU AND YOUR ARMY

## To Get It We'll Have to Fight for It

ON THE day this was written prospects of extra pay for the ground fighting man were neither bright nor altogether hopeless. Fortunately the combat pay proposal is beginning to reach the public at a time when the facts supporting it are persuasive and plainly understood. That the ground fighting man deserves the gesture—which is all it is—for the hazards he runs appears in every headline above dispatches from Korea. A reasonably optimistic man, so it appears, can expect some concrete action before long.

But he'll have to fight for it. "Them that has gets" also means that them that has always will fight to keep what they have even if it is at the expense of the deserving who haven't got.

We think that the opponents of the ground combat pay proposal have badly misjudged their own position in thinking combat pay for the ground fighting man would endanger the monetary advantage they presently enjoy. As *The Washington Post* put it editorially:

"It is true that congressional consideration of combat pay might reopen the controversial issue of extra pay for regular flying personnel and members of submarine crews. That, however, is scarcely the point. Flyers and submariners are now receiving extra pay, as are airborne troops, divers and certain other categories of specialists, for duties that cannot compare in hazard with those of the frontline GIs. Yet the infantrymen are not receiving even the \$10 a month combat pay voted them during World War II."

All the proponents of combat pay

for the ground fighting man need to do is hammer away incessantly with the facts. The brutal, bloody facts. The fact that the ground fighting man sheds much more blood, suffers far greater risks and endures extremely greater physical and spiritual hardships than any of his comrades in arms, no matter what their pay scale.

## A Man Is Part of All He Has Met

OUR half-minute sermon this month must be credited to Charles B. MacDonald, late Captain, 23d Infantry, and author of that realistic account of infantry combat, *Company Commander*. The subject of the sermon is unit loyalty and MacDonald wrote of it in these words in *The New York Times Magazine*:

"Although the average soldier might be reluctant to put his seal to such an abstract idea, the words of Ulysses are still true: a man is a part of all that he has met. A man's unit must survive because it is a part of his own personality, because he is a part of the men around him and they a part of him."

"A man is a part of all that he has met"—the words ring as clearly and enduringly as John Donne's tolling bells. The leader of men who understands their full implication need have no fears.

## Your Journal Shifts to Meet Today's Challenges

THE re-appearance in this issue of "Battle Facts for Your Outfit" and a really fine story of the 178-mile drive through enemy territory that resulted in the link-up of the forces in Southern Korea with the forces that made the Inchon landing in September are

indicative of a slight change in direction which your COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL expects to take in the next few months.

"Battle Facts" was a regular department in the *Infantry Journal* during the war years. Most of the contributors were junior officers and men writing from a first-hand knowledge of combat. What they had to say about the tricks and lessons of battle were of considerable value to our troops in training and we hope that the new "Battle Facts" will be valuable, too. The editors are convinced that today, as in the early 1940s, this magazine can render its greatest service by acting as a clearing house for workable ideas in tactics and techniques, passing them along to troops in training. Experience has taught us that such foxhole-level articles are the most difficult of all articles for editors of service publications to obtain. Partly this is because the only persons who can write them are those with close combat experience. This, we suspect, is because "Battle Facts" deals with the small essentials of combat that miss the eye of observers; they have to be experienced to be appreciated.

This slight change of editorial direction doesn't mean that the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL isn't going to continue to take an interest in the broad questions that affect the military forces of the United States and her allies. We think it is essential that all soldiers have a working understanding of the problems that face our highest civil and military leaders. But we are going to publish fewer "controversial" articles on such subjects as unification (do we or don't we have it?); tactical air power (who should own it?); armor (is the tank a dead duck? if not what kind of tanks should we have?). Not that we'll

evade such questions; when we get a good article on any one of them that sheds more light than heat we'll publish it happily.

We are going to go in for more informative articles about our allies and our enemy. An example is the article in this issue which describes British problems with communists in Malaya. Next month we plan to bring you an informative article on the Chinese Communist Army. And in succeeding issues there will be other similar pieces.

If you have any strong feelings on the emphasis your JOURNAL should take in these critical days we'd like to hear from you—and publish your letter if it has broad appeal. If you don't want it published, tell us and we'll respect your wishes.

### Tell Them This Clearly and Plainly

**T**HREE is a movie being made to tell the American people about the Infantry.

We were asked what we thought should go in it.

We were asked what it should tell the people.

The picture should—

Tell the people that without the Infantry there would be no country.

Tell them that without it the tale of America would have been another tale entirely.

Tell them that without Infantry—good Infantry—the American story will come to an end.

Tell them that the Infantry is men from American homes—men of 18, men of 30, men of 50—men of every walk and calling, every country, every town—men whose fathers, grandfathers, came from every nation.

Tell them Infantry is men who fight for the world.

Tell them that Infantry, true Infantry, is good men, hard men, brainy men—men who must think fast and well to fight and use their many weapons, outwit and kill an enemy trained to fight and die.

Tell that Infantry is a trade, a trade you can't learn in school, factory or office—you can only learn it in the business of war.

Tell them that the Infantry business has been the business of the nation since 1776 and that seven times since then—between all our wars—they, the people of the country, have let the Infantry business go into bankruptcy.

Tell them they let the Infantry drop to ten divisions for four years, when any simple citizen could look at a map and see that even thirty wouldn't be enough when trouble came.

Tell the people that the Infantry is theirs—that they must furnish it and see that it is good—the best Infantry, made of the *best* men out of what they, the people, believe is the best nation of the world.

Tell them that without such Infantry, this nation will be a province of slaves.

Tell them to be proud if their sons or husbands are in the Infantry.

Tell them that only *men* belong in the Infantry—it can't use less than *men*.

Tell them machines can't do the job—it takes *men, men* in the Infantry.

Tell them—

But the movie will only be eighteen minutes long, and you couldn't get all of it in a hundred movies.

But this one picture can say that without the Infantry there will be no United States of America.

### Business as Usual—Concentrations Where Needed

**S**TORY after story of valorous artillery action is coming out of Korea. Point-blank fire, hand-to-hand heroic fighting, support of the infantry in every conceivable manner, according to the book and not according to the book—this war has seen them all.

No battle action, either of defense or attack, without the fullest cooperation of battery and forward observer with the troops that have desperately needed their support.

Long, long lines of ammunition supply that have often means rationing of shells.

Long advances and long retreats that have strained every nerve of endurance.

Attacks by the Communist hordes to meet in overwhelming strength, and seldom enough guns at hand to do the job. Fire direction centers flooded with calls, but giving the utmost support of which battalion, batteries and even single guns are capable.

As never before the artillery has counted. As never before the team it belongs to has fought together in victory and defeat.

The pride of the artilleryman in his powerful part in battle has been

### CIGARETTE

Red tip of a cigarette  
Sweet dry taste of tobacco  
A long time before breakfast,  
Lying in your slit trench  
Just after the leaves lighten  
At dawn alert . . .  
A cigarette is testimony  
There is still heat  
In the world, warmth,  
Flame color, dryness,  
After the cold torture  
Of tropical rain all night.

A cigarette is testimony:  
There is still heat;  
There is still dryness  
Somewhere outside this  
Desolate land of dripping  
Boughs. There is still Kentucky...

There is still Kentucky  
(Keep your eyes on the edge  
Of the jungle clearing;  
Keep your head down.)  
There is still Kentucky;  
Inner Blue Grass.  
In July the velvety  
Pale green tobacco plants  
Tower tall as your shoulder  
While your mule crunches  
The powdery clods as you follow  
The plow. In September,  
The dark is sweet  
West over Kentucky. Blue-Grass  
And Pennyroyal country,  
Three hundred and fifty miles  
When tobacco cures  
In the great tall barns . . .

There is still Kentucky.  
Sweet hot dry taste  
Of tobacco; and it's time  
For my squad to clear  
The front of the perimeter,  
To push out the last  
Lurking raiders  
Concealed in the brush.  
Savor the sweet taste  
Of tobacco; take the last  
Puff luxuriously;  
Time to call out the guard:  
The length of a man's life  
Measured out in the  
Length of a cigarette.

HARGIS WESTERFIELD.

From *Words Into Steel*. By Hargis Westerfield. \$2.75. Copyright 1949 by E. P. Dutta & Co. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

fulfilled. He will go on, as he has always done, calmly and accurately placing his concentrations where they are most desperately needed.

### Dogs and Sailors Keep Off!

**W**E are going to give you here an extensive quotation from an article in the October *U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings* by Lieutenant Leon B. Blair, USN, because it is an enlightening, humorous and sad sidelight on the American people and their armed forces:

"The serviceman, by and large, is altruistic and idealistic. He resents what he thinks is the civilian attitude toward the man-in-uniform. Only 39% of [482] sailors thought that they were treated fairly in the communities in which they were stationed; only one of the 482 had any criticism of Naval justice. The sailor attributes the declining enlistment rate to a poverty of prestige for military service."

"To a certain extent, his resentment is justified. The altruistic sailor can hardly be expected to subscribe to such statements as "The military life appeals not to the ablest and best

men in society, but chiefly to those who cannot adjust themselves to normal civilian life." Just as a civilian press generalized the individual misconduct of a few men as being characteristic of the organization, the sailor is inclined to generalize such things as the tradition that in Norfolk, Virginia, the citizens post signs on their lawns, "DOGS AND SAILORS KEEP OFF THE GRASS," as indicative of the social status of the sailor in Norfolk. The writer has exhaustively investigated that tradition, submitting inquiries to *Our Navy* and various other service papers before finding an individual who would attest to having personally seen such a sign. Mr. Viggo Johnson, an employee of the Rice Institute, Houston, Texas, states that during the Armistice celebrations in November, 1918, he was attached to the U.S.S. *Pyro*, and that he had seen a sign "DOGS AND SAILORS KEEP OUT," posted in restaurant window, either in Norfolk or Newport News, Virginia.<sup>1</sup>

"The sailor responds to such conditions and tradition of those conditions by withdrawing himself and his family from contact with the citizenry. The Navy Mother's Club of America had just such a beginning. "We organ-

ized," according to Mrs. Emma Jones, the founder, "so that we could talk about our boys in the service without apologies. Do you know that in Norfolk, Virginia, they had up signs, 'DOGS AND SAILORS KEEP OFF THE GRASS, . . .' Although Mrs. Jones, too, had subscribed to the tradition, her apprehension was not entirely unfounded. The writer was dissuaded from joining the Navy in 1933 by the plea of his mother that she could no longer face her friends if they knew that she had a son in the Navy, which in that community was regarded as being somewhat of a glorified reform school.

"The reputation of the Armed Forces as a reform school is often traceable to friends of military service. The county judge who suggests that some erring youngster join the army because he recognizes that the well ordered routine of military life will automatically correct his sins, does not intend his option as parallel sentence. Nevertheless, the suggestion that the army is a convenient dumping ground for criminals, criminals in the making, and social misfits does little to enhance the tarnished prestige of military life."

### One Overall Command Report

**W**E are happy to note that where a commander formerly had to make four reports, a new edition of AR 345-105 authorizes one Command Report which is to be complete, impartial and factual. It will include annexes on personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and supporting documents.

In the report the commander may record, review and evaluate the overall activities of his command. He may recommend changes in doctrine, organizations, training, tactics, techniques, administration and equipment which he believes his experience justifies.

The Command Report abolishes the After-action, Narrative and Activities reports and the War Diary.

In combat it will be submitted monthly; in peacetime, once a year.

This sounds like less work and more good information in such reports.

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COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

# BATTLE FACTS FOR YOUR OUTFIT

## Lines From a Company Commander's Notebook

Captain John R. Flynn

THE paragraphs that follow are in no way original with me but are common to all combat commanders in Korea. They re-emphasize basic ideas found in our field manuals and taught at our schools. I hope they will serve to refresh company grade officers who get troop duty.

### Mobility of the Soldier

HAVING been able personally to test some of Colonel S. L. A. Marshall's observations, I have concluded that a more vigorous and searching study should be made of his World War II observations.

In about thirty days of continuous combat none of the men in my company wore combat packs. The mountains and frequent orders to move made it necessary for us to reduce the soldier's load to the absolute minimum. This consisted of:

- Steel helmet
- Fatigues
- Combat boots
- Web belt
- Canteen
- First aid packet
- Bayonet
- Trenching tool
- Ammunition
- Individual weapon

As the nights got colder some soldiers added either a field jacket or poncho. Toothbrush and razor were carried in the pockets of the fatigue uniform. The extra pair of socks, when available, was carried in the helmet or belt.

---

CAPTAIN JOHN R. FLYNN, Infantry, commands Company K, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, in Korea. He is the Captain Flynn mentioned by Colonel Lynch in "Task Force Penetration" on page 10.

Rations transported on organic transportation were issued at places from which they had to be carried only a short distance. We usually used assembly areas and forward attack positions as food issuing points. Whenever possible the ration train followed the assault elements and when the objective was taken and the company reorganized food and water were distributed.

When orders came to move there was no waste motion. We had no tents to strike, packs to roll or cargo pack carriers to slow us up. Each man put on his belt, grabbed his weapon and ammunition and fell in. All rolls, cargo packs, extra equipment and clothing were kept in the kitchen train. Clean fatigues, socks, weapons and other equipment were issued during normal ration breakdown at company supply points.

This small individual load let the soldier conserve his strength for marching and fighting. In such a mountainous country as Korea every ounce of energy is needed. There were fewer heat exhaustion cases, too.

We saved space when moving by truck because there were no rolls, packs or duffel bags to eat up cargo space and impede our movement. More than once we loaded thirty to thirty-five men in a 2½-ton truck for marches of fifteen to one hundred miles. Our supply discipline was effective since our men weren't carrying a lot of clothing and equipment that they didn't need at the moment. This minimum load also put less strain on the walking soldier's most precious asset—his feet. We had plenty of foot trouble without aggravating the condition by over-loading our men.

Obviously, the load the soldier carries will vary with the weather but

we should always strive for the "light" load.

### Supply

WE MADE our unit administrator responsible for supply including water, rations, ammunition, weapons, clothing and equipment. He also supervised the organic transportation and was responsible for ammunition loads on organic transportation. Supply was a big problem in Korea and deserved an officer's full time but I had no executive officer at the time.

You should stress supply discipline through your chain of command and train all men to salvage every piece of clothing and equipment. To help them do this you can develop a simple procedure for pick up and disposition of salvage.

### Communications

YOUR communications noncom is easily one of the most important men in the company. If he knows his job and has a fair degree of initiative he will make your job easier and the company more efficient. If he is a good man you can make him responsible for all communications equipment and its use. He should teach your company and platoon messengers to operate the company switchboard, lay and splice wire, and radio procedure. All messengers should be salvage experts in communications equipment. Messengers should always carry panel sets and flares; this includes platoon as well as company messengers.

If you and your communications noncom can put over an intensive communications indoctrination program you will find that it is much easier to "get the message through."



## COMMUNIST WEAPONS CAPTURED IN KOREA

THE four pages of pictures that appear here are of weapons captured in Korea. They reveal that the Soviet rulers equipped its Korean puppets with both hand-me-down World War II surplus plus weapons of post-war development. If some of the very latest Soviet weapons didn't appear on Korean battlefields it may or may not have been due to Soviet reluctance to reveal the advanced state of its ordnance.

In this line-up, from front to rear: PPSH submachine gun, caliber 7.62mm.; M1938 carbine, 7.62mm.; probably a Japanese M1939 rifle, caliber 7.7mm.; DP light machine gun, caliber 7.62mm.; obsolete PTD M1941 antitank rifle, 14.5mm.; Maxim M1910 machine gun, 7.62mm.; and DShk M1938 antiaircraft machine gun, 12.7mm. (the tripod may be its mount).



At left and above are shots of the Goryunov M1943 heavy machine gun, caliber 7.62mm. The frame is swung about to provide the antiaircraft mount. The shield is missing.



The PTRS (initials stand for the arsenal where made) M1941 antitank gun, caliber 74.5mm.



The "standard" rifle of the Soviet Army is this M1891/30 Mosin bolt-action piece, caliber 7.62mm. The attached sight is probably 4-powered designed for use of snipers.




The Soviet-made M1943 120mm. mortar.



Maxim M1910 water-cooled machine gun, 7.62mm.



Soviet submachine gun, caliber 7.62mm.



Rear view of the T34 tank mounting an 85mm. gun. Note the burned bodies of crewmen.



Potato masher hand grenade of Chinese manufacture. It is common to all Chinese armies.



Soviet M1937 antitank gun, caliber 45mm.



Soviet self-propelled gun, caliber 76mm. Designed and used by tank and mechanized divisions, this gun is now organic to the regimental artillery of rifle divisions. Eighteen are allotted each division.



Soviet M1942 antitank gun, caliber 45mm.


Soviet M1942 gun, caliber 76mm., used by division artillery. Soviet DivArty also boasts a 122mm. howitzer.



Soviet M1927 field gun, caliber 76mm., used as a regimental weapon (a howitzer, but "gun" is Soviet designation).



The barrel of the 85mm. gun on this T34 was probably blown by its crewmen before they abandoned it.



# ICE PREPARATION

## Lieutenant Colonel James H. Lynch

To link-up with the 31st Infantry Regiment a task force of the 7th Cavalry Regiment drove 178 miles through enemy territory, engaging in a sharp skirmish at a river crossing on the first night and a remarkable tank-killing spree on the final night

AT 1700 21 September 1950, near Tabu-Dong, which is twelve miles north of Taegu, Lieutenant Colonel William A. Harris, commander of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, issued a warning order. As soon as the 1st Battalion had taken Tabu-Dong and joined with the 8th Cavalry about two miles south of it, the order read, I would organize Task Force Lynch and move my force in a motorized column to seize and secure the river-crossing at Sonsan on the Nakdong, some 25 miles to the northeast.

The territory my force would move through to get there was held by part of the North Korean 1st and 3d Divisions. These elements had been badly mauled by the 1st Cavalry Division and the ROK 1st Division in ten days of recent fighting around Waegwan, Tabu-Dong, and the walled city of Kasan. The enemy appeared about ready to collapse and pursuit to the Nakdong would follow the breakthrough.

To make up the Task Force, my 3d Battalion was to be reinforced by two platoons with a total of seven M4 tanks; also, the regimental I&R Platoon, one engineer company with a bulldozer, a 4.2 chemical mortar platoon, and the 77th Field Artillery Battalion less one battery. We would also have an air control party to furnish us air cover.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES H. LYNCH, Infantry, was Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division at the time he wrote this article. He is a 1938 graduate of the Military Academy.

By 1900, the 7th Cavalry took Tabu-Dong and joined the 8th Cavalry to the south. I moved the battalion into a perimeter defense for the night of the 21st, just west of Tabu-Dong, closing by 2200 hours. My staff at once went to work planning the Task Force organization with the idea of setting out on the new mission at 0600. At 0200 Colonel Harris and his staff came to our CP and confirmed his warning order with an execution time of 0630, 22 September. The planning was done by

0330 and I called for a meeting of all commanders for first light at 0530.

But around 0400, some 2,000 North Koreans let loose. They had been trapped between the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments and now tried to break through and get away to the north. Their supposed escape route included our battalion perimeter and the area just to the east of it. For the next two hours we were busy. But repeated banzai attacks into the CP and the area around it were all repelled and the North Koreans final-



After the tie-in with the 31st Infantry Regiment near Osan, Colonel Lynch and his commanding officer, Colonel Harris, discuss future operations with the commanding officer of the 31st Infantry, Colonel Summers.



American forces use an underwater bridge which spanned a branch of the Nakdong River northwest of Taegu. This bridge is probably similar to the one seized and used by Task Force Penetration to get across the Nakdong.

ly shifted their escape effort to the west.

I had decided that we couldn't organize the Task Force under fire, and the regimental commander approved the idea of holding up the commanders' meeting until the local situation cleared. We held it at 0600 and set 0800 as the hour for Task Force Lynch to move out.

At that hour the I&R Platoon led out followed in order by the two tank platoons, the engineer company, my command group, Company L, Company K, Battalion Headquarters Company, Company M, Company I, and the field artillery battalion (minus). We went five miles without incident through a devastated country. The Air Force had done a complete job of destroying enemy weapons, tanks, and ammunition along that route.

About five miles out, the point came under sporadic small-arms fire and deployed to return it. I went up and got them back in their vehicles with instructions to push right through anything except determined resistance. Farther along, the point was again halted several times by hand grenadeing from the paddies on the right of the road. With the assistance of the division commander, General Gay, and assistant division commander, General Allen, this brief resistance was also eliminated and the column moved on. Our pursuit had been so immediate and aggressive that the enemy had had no

time to mine the road. After the hand-grenade fight I decided that the tanks should lead the column and had the I&R Platoon follow them. The column now continued rapidly and there was little resistance.

Throughout the move, the air patrol kept attacking the fleeing enemy column five to ten miles ahead of us with good effect.

As the tanks rounded a bend of the road at Naksong-Dong, the lead tank was hit by fire from two antitank guns concealed by the road about two hundred yards ahead. On order, the tanks pushed forward and eliminated the two guns, allowing the column to keep on moving.

At this point I received an air-dropped message from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters. It was unsigned and unauthenticated. It changed our objective to the ferry crossing at Nakdong-Ni, some ten miles beyond our original objective. After a talk with General Gay, who was still with us and didn't know about this change, it was decided that we would keep on toward Sonsan, as originally ordered. We would verify the change of orders as we moved. Verification would probably come before we reached Sonsan.

Several miles farther on, the I&R Platoon got involved in a grenade fight with a squad of North Koreans holed up in a culvert beside the road. It was a peculiar and amusing fight to watch. As I came up, I saw the

I&R men dash up to the ditch and drop grenades into it and then dash back. At once several enemy grenades came out of the culvert and the I&R Platoon scattered away from them. One I&R jeep was stalled in the road above the culvert. In trying to place a close one in the culvert, one scout missed and landed his grenade right under his own jeep. It caught fire and burned briskly. But after ten minutes of the fight, the culvert became quiet and the column proceeded again.

At 1530 we came in sight of Sonsan on the Nakdong, and still there was no verification of the changed mission. An I&R scout came running back to report a large enemy counter-attack coming across the river. I dismounted Company L and started forward with them to block it. When we reached the head of the column, we could find no resistance there. We did find a rather shamefaced lieutenant, who explained that his message must have been garbled.

T was 1600 now, and our immediate concern was security for the night. There was still no word on the change in our orders. We were twenty-five miles in enemy territory. I knew nothing about the situation except in my own immediate area. I did have permission from the division commander to hole up for the night on my original objective at least until the change was verified. So we pulled in the two-hour-long column and organized a perimeter. We had just gotten this done, at 1800, when the orders came through to head immediately to Nakdong-Ni, ten miles north, and secure the river-crossing there. The delay wasn't entirely wasted. We had spent our time flushing out some fifty North Koreans hiding in the paddies and the surrounding hills.

Just as the sun went down at 1900, the lead tank moved out with infantrymen riding on it. The rest of the column followed. A bright three-quarter moon helped out enough to make our progress steady and smooth. About half way to the new objective we began to pass some burning villages. Soon we ran into the rear of a retreating North Korean column.

We followed a novel procedure. Instead of opening fire, we merely kicked them in the pants and started them to the rear with their hands on their heads and without any guards.

After nearly five miles of this, the head of the column halted for some reason and I went forward to see what the trouble was. I found the head of the column had reached a bluff overlooking the river-crossing. Just as I arrived a tank opened fire and a tremendous fire flared up just in front of the lead tank. Then all hell broke loose. It was an enemy ammunition truck loaded with heavy stuff and it began to blow up part at a time. By the light of the fire it made, we could see a column of about 400 enemy foot troops crossing the river on the sunken bridge below the bluff to our left. Our tanks commenced firing on them but for some reason word was shortly passed back to cease firing. But in a few minutes the staff got both tanks and infantry to take up the fire again and the resulting slaughter in the river was terrific.

In all this confusion, word spread back to our own foot soldiers that the big explosions up ahead (from the ammunition truck) were enemy infantry dropping grenades on us from the bluff above us on our right. I sent a platoon up on the bluff to end that rumor and secure that flank, and then concentrated on the actual fight which kept up for another ten minutes.

By that time, the explosions from the ammunition truck had set fire to several others and shells, grenades, and small-arms ammunition were bursting and popping and whizzing all over the place. One shell came into the middle of the forward CP and wounded a tanker, so we immediately backed the column off about a hundred yards. But a reconnaissance of the fire up ahead did reveal that we had caught a large number of enemy field pieces and trucks and several tanks, all abandoned.

**A**T THIS stage a quick estimate revealed: (1) It was 2300 hours. (2) There was a sizable fire block to reduce before we could proceed. (3) We still had to secure the far bank of the river to fulfill our mission. (4) I could only guess at the continuation of the road on the far bank to determine the objective for a river crossing. (5) The road was so narrow and so jammed that the assault boats back at the rear of the column probably couldn't be brought forward.


The engineers (less their one bulldozer which had broken through a bridge at the rear of the column) and the tanks too, went to work on the block and got the six burning vehicles and guns off the road before the fire spread any further. This took several hours and involved many individual acts of genuine heroism, when you consider the explosive situation and the intense heat. During the same time it was possible to pull the undamaged enemy equipment ahead of the fire out of the road, and there we found a bag of some fifty usable trucks of different sizes. Many still bore the unit markings of American outfits—equipment lost during the July withdrawal. Besides the trucks there were twenty artillery pieces and two tanks. We picked up two other abandoned tanks farther to the rear.


This clearing operation continued for the rest of the night. While it was going on I sent an engineer reconnaissance party across the river to investigate the crossing site; and also an I&R squad to reconnoiter the far bank. The unit commanders were called together and at 0200 they received a tentative order to begin crossing in column on the sunken bridge at 0430 with Company K in

the lead, Company I to follow, and Company L securing the high ground on the near bank. This last was necessary because POWs had said that over a battalion had dispersed into the hills on the near bank when our task force got there. I knew, also, that the enemy behind us might come up on our rear hoping to use the crossing as an escape route.

I moved the mortars up and the tanks also took position on the bluff to support the crossing by fire. The machine-gun sections were attached to the crossing companies and the 75mm recoilless rifle platoon took up blocking positions on the near bank on the road leading to the north.

At 0300 the reconnaissance patrol reported back that troops could cross the underwater bridge waist deep, and gave the location of the road on the far side. They had no information on just how the road on the far side ran through the mountain, so I guessed about where it should go, and assigned objectives to I and K Companies based on this guess. Guides from the I&R men who had already crossed the river once on reconnaissance were assigned those companies and the attack was confirmed for 0430. At 0400 the attack companies picked up their forward ob-





A tank-infantry team of the 1st Cavalry Division grinds through the heavy dust of a well-travelled Korean mountain road. This typical scene was snapped some days before Task Force Penetration embarked on its drive to Osan.

servers from the mortars and artillery, their guides from I&R and wire teams from the battalion communications platoon. At 0430 the lead element of Company I moved into the icy water over the sunken bridge.

The current was swift and the footing tricky. Men lost their footing and had to be pulled out. And just as the lead company entered the river, another of the long list of unexpected incidents occurred. Right at the exit of the sunken bridge on the far side of the river, a pile of ammunition began to burn and explode. What started it I don't know. It may have been smouldering from our fire fight and suddenly fanned into flames by a breeze. Or North Korean soldiers may have set it going for the very purpose it served. At any rate, the whole area of the bridge exit was now lighted up and all the secrecy of our crossing lost. It was a weird sight — the troops swarming out of the river and ducking fast around the exploding ammunition pile. But by 0530 as dawn broke, the two companies were across and moving on to their objectives.

As it grew brighter, I studied the terrain from my OP and saw that the road veered to the right from the direction I had thought it took at the time of my original moonlight estimate. I called the company commanders on the radio and shifted their objectives. But half an hour later by the time the morning mist raised and full daylight had come, there was the road right where I had guessed it was by moonlight. A second radio call got the companies back on the right track and by 0730 we could radio the regimental commander "mission completed."

In twenty-three hours, the Task Force had penetrated thirty-six miles into enemy territory, captured five tanks, fifty trucks and twenty field pieces; made a night river crossing, secured our division bridgehead, and killed or captured over 500 of the enemy.

On the next day, 23 September, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, passed through our 3d Battalion, crossing the river and occupied Sangju, ten miles farther to the north. That night my Task Force marched to Sangju, los-

ing by 0600 24 September. At 1100 that day Company K, commanded by Captain John Flynn, with company attachments and a platoon of tanks, pushed forward to Poun, thirty miles northwest, and secured that town by 1730 with only minor opposition. On the 25th, the rest of the Task Force moved up to Poun and reconnoitered roads to the north. We found them impassable and returned to Poun on the night of the 25th.

**A**T 1000 on 26 September I received orders to move the Task Force north immediately to effect a junction with the 7th Infantry Division at Osan, fifty-five air miles (102 road miles) distant. The head of the column—an I&R squad and three-M4 tanks—moved out at 1130. We went for many miles without opposition and with cheering crowds of liberated South Koreans greeting us along the way. At 1730 the column had to halt temporarily. The tanks had run out of gas. The refuel truck supposed to be in the column had failed to join up. So we collected the gas cans from all the trucks in the column which gave us enough to fill up three of our six tanks. Then, just at the right moment, a North Korean maintenance convoy of three trucks moving south bumped into the head of our column. The drivers bailed out and we looked over their loads. There was enough gas to refuel our other three tanks, so we were soon on our way again.

The regimental commander, Colonel Harris, who was with us now had a bold idea. He authorized us to proceed with lights at my discretion. I gave this order and also instructed the three lead tanks to move aggressively to Osan and thence north to Suwon if the 7th Division was not at Osan. The three lead tanks were followed by the I&R squad, the engineer platoon, the command group, Company I, Company L, Headquarters Company, the artillery battery, and Company K. The remaining three tanks joined the tail.

The moon was up but clouds obscured our vision. Behind us were miles of lights winding through enemy-held territory. Not long after dark, I could tell by the lights that our three lead tanks were moving faster than the truck column could, but all efforts to slow them down by -300 radio failed. After riding "point" for several miles, we began to see

groups of fifteen or twenty North Korean soldiers in each village we passed and they were apparently just as surprised to see us as we were to see them. The next vehicle behind me was some distance back, so I decided that discretion was in order rather than valor and held fire.

About that time, a quick mental review of FM 7-20 revealed no situation in which the battalion command group is supposed to act as point for a column in enemy territory. So we pulled over and put a platoon of infantry in trucks out ahead as point, with a 3.5 rocket launcher and a caliber .50 machine gun.

We took up the march again and along the way shot up one truckload of North Korean soldiers who refused to surrender. We were now ten miles from Osan and continuing to encounter isolated groups of enemy which we fired upon and killed or dispersed. Pretty soon we began to hear tank or artillery fire and see sporadic small-arms tracer fire some distance ahead. I decided the parade

was over and ordered the lights turned off.


**J**UST short of Habang-ni, we bypassed a bridge and continued on through the village. To the right of us, twenty yards off the road, we noticed an enemy tank with its tube pointed right across the road. I made some joke about it to the S-3, Captain Cecil Curles, thinking it was like the others we had passed which the Air Force had destroyed, but I ducked under the line of fire of its tube.

Just as we passed the tank the solemn voice of Captain Johnston, commanding the regimental Mortar Company, came over the radio: "Don't look now, but to our right is a T34." Almost at that very moment the tank opened up with machine-gun and cannon fire. We pulled over and hit the ditch and so did the rest of the column. The tank, along with its brother also in ambush, continued to fire up and down the road, over our heads in every direction.

This kept up for several minutes while I said my prayers and took stock. The S-2, Lieutenant John Hill, pushed ahead and pulled back the point (the platoon of infantry and their precious 3.5-inch rocket launcher). We could not tell but we felt sure the tanks had some infantry with them. So Lieutenant Nicholas, the artillery liaison officer (FM says nothing about this for artillery liaison officers or S-2s either) organized an attack on the tank area with the platoon and the bazooka team.

Meantime, Captain Curles, the S-3, was trying to make contact on the -608 with the regimental commander, or S-3, or anybody without success. The tank kept on firing down the road and across the fields. Captain Curles and I worked our way across the road as the tank hunters moved toward their target. As they moved up, the enemy tanks started their engines and gunned them, but didn't move away. The bazooka team then knocked out one of the tanks, but before it could get the other, it moved out and started down the column. After running over several of our own vehicles, it went off into the paddies on the right side of the road for several hundred yards and from there opened fire on the column. Major Hallden, my executive officer, had organized the antitank action in the middle of the column. A 75mm recoilless rifle returned the enemy fire and this halted the tank but didn't stop its fire. But now a bazooka team with Captain James Webel, regimental S-3, and Lieutenant Woodside, commander of Company L, closed with the other tank and destroyed it. Captain Webel administered the *coup de grâce* with a can of gasoline into the engine. The gas exploded and blew him off the tank but he suffered only minor burns.

While this battle with the tanks was going on, the situation was still confused up at the head of the column. The village and several of our trucks were burning. This cast a strange light over the whole scene. And at this juncture we could hear the roar of tank engines and the clank of tracks coming from the north. The first optimistic thought I had was that they were the three point tanks which had run away from us earlier in the evening. But then the clank of the tracks got clearer as they came over the hill some eight hundred yards ahead, and I began to feel less cheerful about them. I told





As Task Force Penetration pushed towards the outskirts of Osan it ran onto this welcome sign, touchingly posted by its comrades from the 7th Infantry Division, which had spearheaded the southward drive from the Inchon end run.

Corporal Howard, my driver, to get up forward quick and throw the lead 2½-ton truck across the road to block it. He dashed out and jockeyed the truck into position. The brakes failed to hold, but Howard deliberately stayed right with it until he had it accurately placed, with the North Korean tanks coming down upon him less than a hundred yards away.

Finally the tanks—two of them—pulled up less than ten yards from the truck (Howard had bailed out by this time). The commander inquired in Korean the equivalent of "What the hell goes on here?" This settled all doubt in the minds of American bystanders (an inaccurate term: we were still low in the ditch) and we opened with rifle fire to make the tanks button up. The reaction was immediate and positive. Machine guns and cannon opened up and the truck burst into flames. This was a most lucky break because it delayed the tanks for ten minutes—while our three remaining tanks were moving up and engaging in battle and the bazooka teams down the column were organizing for action.

Then followed a strange and fasci-

nating sight. Our three M4s moved up in column into the fire-lit battle area and exchanged shots with the enemy tanks. They closed finally to a range of ten yards, both still firing. But then it became obvious that our M4s were defeated after accounting for one of the T34s. The enemy tanks then moved on down our column and into the paddies on its flank. By this time the total of enemy tanks that had come up was ten.

One enemy tank carefully picked its way down the column after running over several jeeps, and as it went it fired bursts of machine-gun fire into the radiators of each vehicle.

About this time, Captain Robert B. McBride, headquarters commandant, not fully understanding the situation and thinking the tank to be friendly, got out in the road and gave the North Korean tanker hell for overrunning his jeep and told him not to be so careless. The answer was a burst of machine-gun fire. It creased Captain McBride and at a ceremony next day he was awarded the "Order of the Purple Pants." He at once gave up directing traffic and the tank moved on. But a 105mm

howitzer of Battery C, 77th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Captain Wardlow, which had gone into hasty position, blew the turret off the tank at a range of thirty yards.

From the head of the column I moved back to rejoin the lead rifle company and find Colonel Harris. I located both and also found that the tank fighters were still active. For the next hour, the bazookas went after tanks under the personal direction of Captain Weibel, regimental S-3, Lieutenant Hill, my S-2, and Lieutenant Nicholas, artillery liaison officer with the battalion. The tank fighters stopped them with their 3.5-inch launchers and finished them with grenades and gasoline.

The regimental commander decided we had better hole up on position and reorganize before going any farther. In the dark, we rounded up the scattered groups of riflemen, got the company commanders together, organized a perimeter defense, and took stock of the damage on both sides. On the enemy side, we had destroyed seven T34 tanks; three had withdrawn. On our own side, we had lost two tanks, about fifteen vehicles, two men killed and twenty-eight wounded. The battle had lasted about two hours.

By 0200 on 27 September the position was secure. I sent out a tank-killer reconnaissance patrol to look for the other enemy tanks. They reported back at 0530 with no success.

At 0700 on 27 September the battalion was organized for a foot approach march to Osan now four miles distant. Just as Company L, the advance-guard company, was leaving its position, a burp gun opened up from somewhere within its area. Without hesitation the nearest platoon, under Lieutenant Woodside, closed in with marching fire and silenced the gun. It didn't take two minutes.

The column moved out. And once more we heard tank engines just over the hill and tank-cannon fire began to fall to our right. The point, armed with a 3.5 bazooka, closed in and accounted for tank No. 8.

The rest of the march was without incident. We linked up with the 31st Infantry (7th Division) at Osan at 0830 on 27 September.

This time, Task Force Penetration had covered 102 miles, destroyed or overrun thirteen tanks, and killed or captured about 200 of the enemy—in twenty-one hours.

# NEW APPROACHES TO WORLD PEACE

*Written for Combat Forces Journal and Coronet*

## **General J. Lawton Collins**

**We can keep the peace and secure the future only if we have an Army equipped and armed with weapons that will make it superior in mobility and fire power**

If our Army is to be an effective force to prevent war, or to oppose armies superior in numbers of men and quantities of equipment—as it has twice had to do in Korea and as it may have to do if war should come again elsewhere in the world—then our Army must have the greatest mobility and fire power that American genius can produce.

For only one military organization can hold and gain ground in war, as the Korean fighting has so amply proved—a ground army, supported of

course by tactical aviation and with supply lines guarded by a navy. It was such a team—Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force—in splendid unity among themselves and with our United Nations partners, under General MacArthur's distinguished leadership that turned the desperate Pusan bridgehead into a brilliant military victory and had completely routed the Korean Communists before a new invasion by a new enemy. And it is such a team that will win if the free world is again invaded.

The survival of our nation, and of the entire free world, may depend upon how well we succeed in producing sufficient mobility and fire power for our ground forces. In this endeavor, we must not permit recent experience to obscure what we may need in the future. For example, we must guard against the tendency to look upon the Korea fighting as a "Preview of Future War."

The war in Korea has been a reversion to old-style fighting — more comparable to that of our own Indian



**WE COULD TELL you that General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, began his military career as a Doughboy when he graduated from the Military Academy in 1917 and that he has attended the Infantry School (Advanced and Company Officers' Courses), Field Artillery School (Advanced Course), Command and General Staff School, Army Industrial College, and Army War College. But we would prefer to quote what Colonel (formerly Brigadier General, AUS) Richard Cantwell, Infantry, USA, the hero and principal protagonist of Ernest Hemingway's new *Across the River and Into the Trees*, had to say about General Collins. "Give you Lightning Joe as a good one," said Colonel Cantwell. "Very good. . . . Commanded the Seventh Corps when I was there. Very sound. Rapid. Accurate. Now Chief of Staff."**

frontier days than to modern war. Although some of the equipment, and some of the tactics the enemy has used, are undoubtedly similar to what we might expect to face in a war of the future, I do not believe the Korea fighting is typical of future war.

Our troops have not been subject to any significant air attack; our air forces have enjoyed complete command of the air; and hostile naval action has been insignificant—all of which has permitted our ground forces and our splendid logistical support to reach their maximum effectiveness. Of course, the fact that the great strength of the Korean Communists lay in ground forces would be typical of any war we might fight elsewhere in the world, for it is in huge ground forces that the greatest strength of the police states lies.

To prevent an invasion of western

Europe, the area most coveted by the Communists, we would have to fight an altogether different war than we have been fighting in Korea. Our logistical support would be subjected to air and naval attack, and we and our friends would face a very strong tactical air force. This would mean that our own tactical air forces would have a more difficult task, and Army antiaircraft would play a greater role. With modern road nets and communications systems, armor would take on increased importance. We would have to face many more tanks, including heavy tanks.

Therefore, it is my conviction that we must not let such attacks as the one in Korea cause us to discontinue our long-range programs for development of new equipment including the tactical application of atomic weapons by Army troops, which will

not only strengthen our own forces but will assist the other nations of the free world. Our continued security requires that we and our friends apply our resources—manpower, scientific genius and industrial capacity—to cope with this problem. The progress we and our friends have already made is so encouraging that I feel we must increase our effort.

For these reasons, I believe that modernization of equipment is the No. 1 problem of the Army.

Any discussion of the Army must be prefaced with the statement that the individual soldier is still the most important element on the battlefield. There can be no substitute for him. Since our potential enemies have forces in being much larger than we have, our soldiers must have the maximum effectiveness that our superior scientific and industrial power can provide.

In the modernization of the Army's equipment, we have been placing special emphasis on airborne and air-transportability, tanks and antitank weapons, antiaircraft and guided missiles, and tactical air support. Let us take them up one at a time.

#### Airborne and Air-Transportability

THE concept that we must exploit the increased capabilities of air power by bringing air mobility to all possible resources of the Army has far-reaching implications. Most of our units, other than airborne divisions, have been in the past trained and equipped to move by land and water. Under this new concept, we have the opportunity to increase the mobility and radius of operation of ground troops many times over. The progress we have already made is so encouraging we must not let the obstacles that remain deter us from vigorously exploring this promising new field—which I consider to be one of the most important developments in land warfare in modern times.

It is our hope that through increased air mobility, each of our divisions eventually can do the work of several present-day divisions. That hope is based not on mere speculation, but on the impressive results we achieved by the limited employment of air power in committing men and equipment to combat from the air in the great land battles of World War II, and in Korea, where air power delivered the first troops into the fight and continued to deliver

*Front view of the new detachable "pod" plane with the detached cargo compartment in the background. This experimental model was built by Fairchild.*



large quantities of supplies and replacements both from the U.S. and from Japan, as well as parachutists directly into combat.

### Assault Transports

FOR example, because our new assault transports can take off and land in incredibly short distances, it may be possible to develop comparable transports which could operate from aircraft carriers. It seems to me that such a combination of sea and air transport could be used to great advantage in delivering Army airborne and air-transported units to their objectives. And it also seems that by this means, the Navy would logically extend one of its vital roles, transporting the Army.

We are working very closely with the Air Force and the Navy in a joint effort to solve our mutual problems. Among the specific improvements we have made is the prototype of a plane that can carry a tank. This is a significant achievement, since our inability to deliver tanks by air was one of the greatest weaknesses of our airborne operations of World War II. This plane can carry two hundred fully equipped men, or fifty thousand pounds of cargo.

We have also developed planes and equipment that have not only carried successfully the jeep and the 105mm howitzer but have permitted us to drop them by parachute. We have prototypes of gliders than can carry double the loads transported by gliders during World War II, and new assault transport planes that may actually replace the glider in airborne operations. And we have the new pack-plane with a detachable cargo compartment or "pod." This plane is able to take off immediately after delivering men or equipment to the airhead, without having to wait for the cargo to be unloaded from the pod.

We have been using helicopters in Korea, and are awaiting development of new prototypes which we believe will give us unprecedented capabilities for combat operations in the future. And we are hopeful that we may be able to develop the so-called "convertiplane," which would incorporate the vertical take-off and landing characteristics of the helicopter with the horizontal-flight characteristics of conventional aircraft.

In my opinion, we have only begun to exploit the possibilities of applying air transportation to the Army.



*This 15-ton cargo carrier developed by the Ordnance Department has a V-12 air-cooled 810 hp. engine, wobble-stick steering and torsion-bar suspension.*

Given transports in sufficient quantity, our divisions could assume greater strategic importance for distant areas threatened in the world, or in the far-flung operations of a global war. With the necessary gliders and other specialized equipment, our airborne divisions could go over enemy lines to strike vital targets which otherwise could only be taken at great loss in men and equipment.

### Tanks and Antitank Weapons

THE effectiveness of our tanks in Korea has been the subject of considerable comment. In the early phases of the fighting, much criticism was directed at our apparent inability to counter the threat posed by modern tanks of Soviet design. Today I believe that the splendid performance of our tanks and antitank weapons in Korea testifies eloquently to the encouraging progress we have made. However, I believe I should clarify some misunderstandings that apparently have arisen with respect to our tank warfare.

Because we recognize we shall be on the defensive during the initial phases of any future war, we have had to place emphasis upon development and production of weapons which will give us the greatest pos-

sible defensive strength. The sheer magnitude of our requirements has forced us to place principal reliance for antitank defense upon weapons which we can afford to produce in peacetime in the vast quantities which we would require for war.

We recognize that the tank is undoubtedly one of the best weapons—if not the best weapon—against another tank, especially when we can mount some of our new antitank weapons on it. But the tank is primarily for offensive use in reconnaissance, breakthrough and exploitation, and the price of one tank—upward of \$200,000—would buy a much greater quantity of defensive antitank weapons—bazookas, for example, which cost only \$65. This factor of cheapness is of ever greater significance to the peoples of western Europe, who need defensive weapons they can produce within their struggling economies.

Although we have been emphasizing our development of improved antitank ammunition and the now famous 3.5-inch bazooka, which proved so successful in Korea, we have also been seeking to provide a balanced family of new tanks—light, medium and heavy—unsurpassed in fire power, mobility and defensive armor.

The first member of the series—

the T41 light tank—has far exceeded our expectations, and we are now awaiting delivery of a sufficient number to equip divisions and smaller units. At an early date, we will have pilot models of our new T42 medium tank with a new high-velocity gun which we shall service-test in competition with the new Patton that has performed so well in Korea. Also at an early date we will have pilot models of the new T43 heavy tank, with even greater armament, which we are confident will be capable of defeating any other known tank in existence today.

Much current thinking with respect to tank warfare is dominated by the urgent necessity to devise suitable means of defense against the powerful heavy tanks known to be among the forty thousand tanks in police state armies. There are those who feel that only by matching heavy tank for heavy tank can we hope to win on the battlefield. However, others, equally competent, believe that we may be able to achieve the same results at considerable savings by equipping our highly mobile medium tanks with radically improved guns and ammunition.

I intend to see to it that the development of tanks of all types, as well as antitank weapons, continues to be expedited, although emphasis must always be placed on those items giving the greatest combat effectiveness for the lowest cost.

#### Antiaircraft and Guided Missiles

In the vital field of antiaircraft, the advent of jet aircraft has required radical departures from World War II equipment. The continuing development of planes which attain ever increasing speeds has further emphasized our need for new counter weapons of all types.

Our best answer to date for the threat posed by aircraft at short and medium ranges is the new 75mm "Skysweeper" gun. This weapon has been developed to replace the present standard 40mm gun of World War II fame, which does not have sufficiently sensitive fire control, sufficient range, or sufficient destructive effect to engage modern aircraft.

The primary new features of the Skysweeper are its integral radar-directed fire control system and its VT-fuzed ammunition. Tests to date indicate that this weapon is capable of engaging aircraft at supersonic

speeds, both by day and night. We have orders for a limited number of these weapons now, and expect to buy more of them during each succeeding year. And for detecting and engaging high-altitude aircraft traveling at near-sonic speeds, we are buying a number of extremely accurate fire-control systems for use with our long-range antiaircraft guns.

It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that we are approaching practical limits in the development of conventional antiaircraft weapons and that we must look for more promising means of meeting future requirements. For that reason, we are placing renewed emphasis upon antiaircraft rockets and guided missiles. Only recently I visited our antiaircraft center at Fort Bliss, Texas, and our guided missile proving ground at White Sands, New Mexico, and I can say that genuine progress is being made.

When we get to the procurement stage, the cheapest missile may cost several thousand dollars. The more complicated ones will cost much more, but if one of these can knock out a bomber carrying an atomic bomb, then it would be a cheap investment.

We are also developing surface-to-surface missiles to extend the range of our artillery, especially during those times when due to weather or darkness tactical air support is not available.

#### Tactical Air Support

THE outstanding air-ground support the Air Force, Navy, and Marines furnished ground units in Korea is eloquent proof of the artillery capabilities of modern tactical aircraft.

The success of ground operations in any future war will depend more than ever on the degree of air support and transportation furnished the Army. With the increased fire power afforded by tactical air support to isolate the enemy and drive him to cover, our ground units can gain freedom of movement quickly to overcome an enemy. And this air support can come from either the Air Force, Navy or Marines.

It is for these reasons that we in the Army are placing greater emphasis upon air-ground coordination, and are working with the other services to solve the problems this coordination entails.

#### Man: The Vital Weapon


A FACT that bears constant reiteration is that man has always been the most important ingredient in armies. In the Army, unlike in the Navy and Air Force, the basic element is not a ship, not a plane, but the individual soldier. And new weapons only serve to increase his importance.

We have in the Army today the best men we have ever had. Many are veterans with distinguished records in combat. Many are skillful technicians in a wide variety of fields—radar specialists, engineers, medical men, and many others.

Just as we realize we must achieve maximum effectiveness from our equipment dollar, we also realize we must achieve maximum effectiveness from manpower resources. We can do this only by the use of men of superior quality who can assimilate the training we give them. Weapons such as those I have described and those which may reasonably be expected in the foreseeable future impose unprecedented requirements upon the Army for men with technical and scientific knowledge.

But the Army today needs more than men with technical skill—it also requires men with the highest qualities of leadership and courage. The fighting in Korea has been a signal illustration of this fact. The American troops who held the Pusan bridgehead were at times outnumbered by as many as thirty to one, but courage and determination that sprang from confidence in their weapons, their leaders, their comrades—and most important, confidence in our nation—gave each of our soldiers an effectiveness all out of proportion to his relative strength.

However, our victory in the Pusan bridgehead hung at times by such a small thread upon the courage and determination of a small band of men that we must never place dependence upon such a small margin of safety again. Only by insuring that we and our friends have in constant readiness armies that have a combination of trained and determined men, modern weapons, and skilled and courageous leadership—supported by adequate tactical aviation, and with supply lines guarded by navies—can we command sufficient respect from the evil forces in the world to prevent another dreadful world war, or can we be assured of victory if these evil forces thrust one upon us.



# DIVISION \$LICE

**COLONEL GEORGE C. REINHARDT**

**T**ODAY'S billion-dollar question for National Defense planners boils down to how many American combat divisions, how many Air Force groups, should be activated and maintained?

And can our economy support forces of that size for an undetermined number of years? Can we stand the annual drain of replacing equipment as it becomes rapidly old or outmoded in a world of swift technological changes? Or the expense of training thousands of replacements for the volunteers or selectees each year as they complete their service?

We often hear thoughtful comment from respected military leaders about division programs, air group programs, and so on. But never do we get in simple understandable figures the cost of these things. Discussions of cost become quickly clouded by emotional outbursts, high-level guesses, and lack of detailed data.

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there no way to estimate, accurately and in advance, the cost of keeping our military production lines rolling?

We do know how to estimate the forces we need to handle a given strategic situation projected into the future. Using the division as a unit of fighting strength, we can find the *combat* forces we must have to win a given campaign or do anything else. But to turn "divisions" into "balanced armies," including all the supporting service troops they need, requires the World War II invention, the famous "division slice." This way, you simply add up all the troops in a combat zone and divide the total by the number of divisions there. The "combat slice" you get in this manner is the *average* number of men needed to maintain each division in combat, at that place, and under the conditions which exist at that time.

If we divide the total strength of supporting forces (communications zone) in a theater by the same number of divisions we get the "Com Z slice." Adding this figure to the combat slice, quickly shows the *average* number of men needed for, and including, each active combat division in a particular overseas theater.

From this, other slices follow logically—the Zone of the Interior (ZI) slice, and a so-called "world-wide slice" and later, the "air force" or "wing slice" to account for the Air Force personnel directly involved in any given land campaign. To date no strategic-air slices nor naval slices have been announced despite unification, but these, too, could be arrived at logically enough.

Thus "slices" are a yardstick for estimating the total manpower we need. Equipment requirements can be accurately determined from them as well.

**B**UT what of the costs? All successful industrial corporations keep adequate data on hand for just such purposes. Faced with need for expansion, industry can quickly and accurately estimate the new production line cost per unit, and the changes in overhead charges, and those for additions to plant and equipment. Why can't our armed forces extract similar fiscal rabbits out of the hat of their own experience?

Military planners do not lack experience, yet they have never used it

in the same way as industry. During the tense days of war, costs are figured primarily in casualties. Concern whether national resources can stand the drain upon them drives thought of dollar-cost out the window. But when peace returns, dollar costs become the big problem again. Insufficient items in the military budgets are scrutinized in comparison with last year's figures instead of analyzing their importance to fighting effectiveness.

With the two exceptions of the civil works program of the Corps of Engineers and the procurement division of the now defunct Army Service Forces, no agency of the American Army has ever concerned itself with overhead charges which are essential in determining true costs. Civil works had it forced upon them by political pressure from competing contractors. The ASF procurement people had to know overhead from A to Z in order to handle the incentive type contracts of wartime which were vast improvements over World War I "cost-plus" affairs. They sharpened their knowledge over overheads in the renegotiations of contracts after the war ended.

What these two agencies have done the Army (and the Armed Services) can do. It is, in fact, slowly but surely beginning to as it struggles to operate under a functional budget. But the functional budget will take years to produce and test reliable cost data. The Army needs reliable cost information now. As matters stand at present, we invite the worst possible public relations by our inept fiscal reporting.

Consider the current (pre-Korean) Army budget: \$4 billion to provide an army of 630,000 men. The press seized upon those figures erroneously as indicating a division slice of 63,000 men. We had only ten active divisions before the Korean campaign. The high cost of such a small fighting force got plenty of rough comment. It was remarkable that no one has spelled out the obvious—a \$400,000 division slice! That is what you get by applying simple arithmetic—until the Army enlightens the public.

**C**AN'T we take a hint from industrial cost methods and come up with an additional yardstick for planning? Why don't we use a division "slice" that gives us in dollars clearer infor-

mation than what we now obtain in terms of men and equipment? The Army gets accused in national magazines of spending sixty cents of every budget dollar on "overhead." We know that it isn't true. But our present Army methods of accounting, at least as known to most officers, make an effective rebuttal of this statement impossible. The further charge that our "theoretical Army strength is thirty-seven divisions," infers that 630,000 divided by 17,000 is sound mathematics. But it is actually the same as dividing the total employees of the Bell Telephone System by the number of switchboards and saying that the figure you get is the number of employees required to operate the average switchboard. Repair, maintenance and training (especially the training of leaders for possible future wars) are simply not considered in such figuring.

A flat accusation that the Army's overhead is too high would be even more difficult to refute. We must first adopt cost-accounting methods that enable us to determine that overhead for advance planning.

But let's not be too meek about it. Look at the record and see what contract renegotiation in World War II discovered about industry's own overhead. That unproductive, unavoidable burden of every corporation, large or small, governmental or industrial, needs constant surveillance to hold it within bounds. And ask industry just when overhead charges per unit produced are highest. Is it during periods of maximum production or the reverse?

Certainly the Army's ten-division program for 1951 was not a period of maximum production. But we had to maintain many elements (the much-abused Pentagon, for one) of a 100-division force.

**T**HREE is no possible argument, either, about other overheads. The entire school system of the Army, including the sizable outlay for training the National Guard and Reserve, is overhead—and justifiable overhead. So is inspection. Industry itself recognizes both items.

Unification of the three Armed Services, consolidation within each service, has reduced much unnecessary overhead and will continue to eliminate more. But what is the Army's current overhead? That in it-

self is a neat study for more able pens to give us the facts on. Let's merely examine a supposition, by analogy with American industry.

A large factory would be rash indeed to estimate less than eight per cent overhead. To this must be added charges for district, general and main offices (more overhead), advertising, sales promotion, complaints, research and development (no big industry forgets development any more than the Army does)—all are overhead. It is not at all unusual to find overhead totalling thirty per cent of the gross expenditures. Production line costs never approach, even closely, the wholesale cost price, before profit is added.

**W**HAT then was the production line cost of a combat division in the ten-division, four-billion-dollar budget? Certainly we must deduct the money for stockpiling critical material—\$650 million; and retired pay—\$200 million; though we can accept the charges for research and development as well as the costs of our civilian components (it's part of training) as essential overhead. (If you include retired pay in Army overhead you must get comparative data from industry since it adopted pension plans—and instantly charged them to production overhead.)

Thus the \$4 billion drops to \$3.15 billion before we start estimating. Then charge off forty per cent for overhead—up to early last summer the Army was on a costly single shift basis. (You might even say it was equivalent to the three-day week in the coal industry, though for remarkably different reasons.)

Only then can we properly divide the balance, \$1.89 billion by 10 to find the 1951 fiscal year "division slice" of \$189 million. That's a lot of money—but a lot less than \$400 million!

By this method we can forecast that a 20-division army would cost about \$6 billion, allowing ten per cent for new overhead for all additional divisions to cover possible increase in headquarters and schools. Remember that the "division slice" itself contains its own "field overhead," so it can't be directly compared to a "production-line cost" which has no overhead. By the same process a 30-division army might be supported on an \$8 billion budget, one-third less

than the \$12 billion implied by present thinking uncorrected by Army documents. Here it is in a simple tabulation:

COST OF DIVISION \$LICE	
Total Army budget (fiscal 1951)	\$4,000,000,000
Deductions	
For stockpiling strategic materials	650,000,000
For retired pay	200,000,000
Net Army budget for maintaining the Army	3,150,000,000
Overhead charges: schools; National Guard and Reserve expenses; headquarters, including the Pentagon; inspection; arsenals, etc. (40%)	1,260,000,000
Actual cost of active Army including all service and supply troops and establishments	1,890,000,000
Number of active divisions	10
Present cost of division \$lice	189,000,000
COST OF A 20-DIVISION AND A 30-DIVISION ARMY TODAY	
Overhead charges	\$1,260,000,000
20 divisions at \$189,000,000	3,780,000,000
Additional overhead due to increase of ten divisions: 10% of 10 times \$189,000,000	189,000,000
Total	\$5,229,000,000
By similar computation a 30-division army would cost	\$7,308,000,000
Or when stockpiling and retired pay are added	\$8,158,000,000

The above figures are open to question as reliable estimates. Even so, they are closer to the mark than some figures seriously offered to "prove" that any sizable enlargement of the Defense establishment will bankrupt the Nation and destroy the delightful (for all of us) American standard of living.

Think especially of the benefits of accurate computations when the annual budget is presented to the Armed Services Committees of Congress. There should be no more interminable haggling over comparatively trivial items. (The *Congressional Record* for Army appropriations hearings before the House Committee alone ran to a thousand closely printed pages last year.) Instead there would be a succinct statement, with each figure fortified by defensible, easily understood computations.

At this moment commentators are arguing vociferously the number of divisions the nation needs. More quietly, while Korea remains an active front, costs are freely—and wildly—guessed. Let's come up with our division \$lice at least a reasonable target while the Comptroller's records are slowly working up the final answer.

JANUARY, 1951

## What Can You Believe?

"WHAT CAN YOU Believe?" in war reporting in the October issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL offered the logical conclusion that inept news coverage of combat can be corrected only when the Army and the reporters know each other's problems better. The author, Marshall Andrews, neglected to provide the logical answer except by inference.

He correctly wrote: "Editors who regard military news as not worth reporting in time of peace can hardly be expected to understand military reporting when war forces them to recognize its importance. If these editors assign political or police reporters as war correspondents they will, at least for a time, get political or police reporting from the front."

Granting there are complications which must be ironed out, the answer is this:

Put experienced newsmen—not advertising and public-relations experts—into combat correspondent teams similar to those set up by the Marine Corps during World War II.

There are many newsmen in uniform during wartime who are excellent soldiers. There are many others, however, who could do a more efficient job for the Army as combat correspondents.

Correspondent teams could be set up to work on a divisional basis when the divisions are actually engaged in combat. Regular public information staffs are competent to handle routine publicity on individuals during non-operational periods. But combat reporting is vastly different than batting out "Private-Joe-Doakes-has-been-awarded-the-Good-Conduct-Medal-by-General . . ." for the home-town newspapers.

Mr. Andrews correctly pointed out that Army representatives have more important things to do than see to it that war correspondents get all the facts right. Army combat correspondents, qualified first as soldiers, would have that task assigned to them.

At Portrex most everyone agreed that the public information officers were more involved in public relations work with businessmen-spectators than in assisting newsmen assigned to cover the exercise. It should be obvious that one type of Army man is needed to conduct a tour of civilian observers and another to

properly conduct, brief and assist newsmen. The same applies in wartime; let clerk-typists pound out the blurbs and let newsmen gather and write the news.

In suggesting the formation of Army combat correspondent teams, I go along with the Marine Corps theory that while the correspondent's primary assignment is reporting he still is a soldier and should function as such if necessary.

Trained as a soldier and required to maintain his combat proficiency, these soldier-correspondents would help eliminate errors in war reporting. Army combat correspondents also could reduce the censorship problems. If censorship was at the source rather than hours or days later there would be fewer headaches for both the Army and the writer.

As a news copy editor I agree with Mr. Andrews that minor errors in war reports make big impressions, all bad. It is my job to catch errors before they appear in print but to do that I must know the subject. Being a former Air Force and parachute infantry officer I shudder at the errors I find in news copy every day. Obviously the war correspondent must know his subject.

The Army has its information problems and the newspapers have theirs in obtaining and presenting information that rightly should be given the American public. News is news and the truth will out, so the Army should take it upon itself to see that it provides the information due to the public. It also should insure that this information is correct, violates no security regulations, and is processed in the most efficient manner. The answer is not in releasing official communiqués to newspapermen in the rear areas. The public is entitled to more than a communiqué can give; it is entitled to the "color" of battle; it is entitled to the best that a front-line writer can produce.

Couldn't the Armed Forces Information School handle the orientation of Army combat correspondents and produce a new type, vastly improved public information specialist? I think it could.

LIEUT. LUMAN N. WELLS  
*Infantry-USAR*

# TO GET THE BEST

**Major George Fielding Eliot**

**Our World War II leaders proved themselves in rigorous tests devised and directed by General Marshall. We can do the same today.**

**W**E WANT the best but don't know how to get it. At any rate, that's what COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL told us editorially in a recent issue. "We commend good leadership, but tolerate the faulty

*General Marshall and one of the lieutenants who had proved himself worthy of large responsibilities meet on Omaha Beach during the first week of the invasion.*



and the mediocre, and take strong action only against the obviously poor—and often only after battle proves it bad."

A grim and unpromising indictment to which the shades of those who fell at the two Bull Runs, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, as well as in many an earlier battle, bear angry witness. Yet it has not always been true. One of our wars—the last—was a shining exception.

Why?

Because one man wanted the best and *did* know how to get it.

**I**T WAS in October 1939 that this reporter, just returned from blacked-out London, went into an office in the old State, War and Navy Building to see the newly commissioned Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall.

I had, of course, a few questions to ask. One of them concerned leadership.

Marshall looked at me keenly.

"I'll answer that question in full," he said. "But you are not to publish what I say to you now."

He leaned back in his chair, pausing for a moment as his mental machinery arranged in proper sequence the subject matter of what he was about to say. (I was later to see him do the same trick when speaking to thirty correspondents on the global foreign policy of the United States, with equally adequate and orderly results.)

"The present general officers of the line," Marshall began, "are for the most part too old to command troops in battle under the terrific pressures of modern war. Many of them have their minds set in outmoded patterns, and can't change to meet the new conditions they may face if we become involved in the war that's started in Europe. I do not propose to send our young citizen-soldiers into action, if they must go into

MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT, ex-MI-USAR, became what the press calls a military analyst by way of magazine fiction and a short career as an accountant following World War I service in the Dardanelles and Western Europe with the Australian Imperial Forces. His military title comes from his rank in the prewar Military Intelligence Reserve. He was born in Brooklyn and graduated from Melbourne University, Australia. He lives in New York City.

action, under commanders whose minds are no longer adaptable to the making of split-second decisions in the fast-moving warfare of today, nor whose bodies are no longer capable of standing up under the demands of field service. The experience and judgment of these older officers can be used in training and in maneuvers. They'll have their chance to prove what they can do. But I doubt that many of them will come through satisfactorily. Those that don't will be eliminated."

(As a matter of record, only three officers who were at that time permanent general officers of the line ever commanded U. S. troops in battle in World War II: Krueger, whose worth could not be denied; Wainwright, who chanced to hold command in the Philippines when the Japanese attacked; and Stilwell, who had just been promoted to his first star.)

**M**AРSHALL opened a drawer of his desk and took out a single sheet of paper.

"I've made a little list," he went on. "I've looked over the colonels, the lieutenant colonels and some of the majors of the Army. I've chosen some men who were personally known to me, and some who were recommended to me by others in whose judgment I have confidence. I've boiled down the list to these few, for the present. Remember, Eliot, you're not to publish this, at least not for the present."

He handed me the paper.

Written on it in his own handwriting were about twenty names, with two or three more that had been crossed off. I remember most of those names: Devers, Hodges, Patton, Eisenhower, Eichelberger, Patch, Collins, Simpson, Clark, Truscott, Crittenton, Bradley, and a few more.

"Making out a list like this," Marshall continued, "is easy enough, though I've given a lot of thought to the matter and this is a boiled-down net product of several previous efforts. But the list isn't the end of the matter, by any means. I'm going to put these men to the severest tests which I can devise in time of peace. I'm going to start shifting them into jobs of greater responsibility than those they hold now. Then I'm going to change them, suddenly, without warning, to jobs even more burdensome and difficult. Then


I'll shift them around again. I'm going to pile weight on their shoulders until they're staggering under the load. I'm going to allow them plenty of room to think that I'm treating them arbitrarily, even unreasonably, that I'm asking of them more than human beings should be required to deliver. Maneuvers and the expansion of the Army will afford me ample opportunity for this course of sprouts. Those who stand up under the punishment will be pushed ahead. Those who fail are out at the first sign of faltering. Of course, nothing takes the place of the actual test of battle, but at least if our young men do go into battle I hope to give them commanders of divisions, corps and armies who have been through as severe a testing process as can be devised in time of peace."

**W**HAT General Marshall said he was going to do, he did—as even the most cursory examination of the 1940 and 1941 service records of the officers mentioned will amply testify. Take Eisenhower, for example: During the period November 1940 to December 1941, Eisenhower (beginning as executive officer of the 15th Infantry) was in succession chief of staff of the 3d Infantry Division, chief of staff of IX Corps, chief of staff of Third Army, and assistant chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. This rapid rise in responsibility was earned, of course. But it was also planned.

Most of Marshall's selections came through the fire of his testing, and rose to high command. A few fell by the wayside during the process. A very few were eliminated by the test of battle, at the price of lives. But they were eliminated early, not after a Fredericksburg or a surrender of Detroit. Marshall's system of choosing No. 1 leaders worked—and stood up under the final test of war itself. The record of the Army's achievements in World War II speaks for itself.

So, if we want the best, there is a way to get it, at least as far as top leadership is concerned.

And with General Marshall once more in a place of high responsibility for defense, that way will hardly be forgotten. And such places as the Korean battlefields have provided an even more reliable testing ground than the maneuvers on which Marshall had to rely upon ten years ago.



#### **REDS AND ANTI-REDS**

Like ordinary criminals elsewhere, Malayan "bandits"—a euphemism for communists—are comforted through the bars by their molls. Operations against the bandits in the interior include river patrols and forays into the dense jungles. Trained police dogs, imported from England, are a valuable close-support arm in hand-to-hand encounters.



# They Call 'em Bandits in Malaya

Major Paul M. A. Linebarger

*For ways that are strange and for tricks that are the same we give you Malaya—where it is perfectly legal to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party but not legal to be a Chinese and a member of the Malayan Communist Party*

**M**ALAYA is a military paradox. Strategically it is a well secured portion of the British Empire—that inner empire still governed as a chain

MAJOR PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER, MI-USAR, recently returned to Washington from an extended trip to the Far East. During World War II he was a psychological warfare officer on General Stilwell's staff. He is the author of numerous books of fiction and nonfiction, including *Psychological Warfare*, published by the Infantry Journal Press. He is Professor of Asiatic Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

of colonies from London. At the same time it is one of the most successful areas of Communist guerrilla activity. Both the British and the Communists are doing well. Each has dented the other very perceptibly. But in three years of open warfare neither one has put the other out of business.

One of the basic factors behind the paradox lies in the fact that neither side is fighting a war. The Communists are waging a "liberation" and the British are using combat forces for "an emergency." It's something like a field with a basket at one end and goal posts at the other, with two husky teams, one playing basketball and the other football, and each determined not only to win, but to win in its own peculiar way.

To start with, British Malaya isn't British Malaya; there is no such thing. There is the Crown Colony of Singapore, a large island with a big Chinese city on it. Singapore has some Malays, somewhat more than there are American Indians in New York City. Singapore is governed by a British governor. It has all the machinery of a democracy. As one of the local bigwigs told me, the Hindus run the political parties, the Chinese do the voting, and the Scots get elected.

The rest of British Malaya is the Federation of Malaya. Part of this is British and part of it merely a British protectorate. Both parts are in the Federation, so that George VI, in the role of local sultan for the old cities of Penang and Malacca, sits vicariously as a co-equal with the other sultans (of Johore, Negri Sembilan, Perak, and so on) under a high commissioner who represents the British King in London. Just to keep the situation from being too simple, the British have installed a policy-making official called the Commissioner General for Southeast Asia who coordinates not only Malaya with Singapore, but



both of them with British Hong Kong and British Borneo.

The British military command is divided up between the three services and the two governments in British Malaya. Coordination is effected by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, a brilliant improviser who, since he is a key military personage in British Malaya, obviously serves in a civilian capacity. Otherwise his role would be unparadoxical and probably that might be un-British. It is up to General Briggs to coordinate everything he can find—governments, police, land forces, naval forces, air forces, and so on—in a unified campaign to suppress persons whom the British authorities do not describe as "Communists," but as bandits whose "rebellion" is labelled an "emergency." And warfare against them is not "war" but "operations."

Do you begin to see the picture?

The British are conducting operations against bandits, not a war against Communists. If they did, you see, the insurance rates would go up. Besides, if they used ordinary Anglo-Saxon words for what they are doing, even the British home public might wake up to the fact that the British are fighting the Reds in Malaya, trading with them in Hong Kong, buttering them up in Peking, and shooting them dead in Korea—and that would be a little too paradoxical even for the British home public. Hence, the British in Malaya find it much safer to use the magic words, "bandits" and "operations."

But all of this gets back to infamy.

THE jungle is so thick in most of Malaya that a man disappears completely six feet from a trail. Hot pursuit is out of the question. Even atomic weapons could not clear the thousands of square miles of fantastically rich jungle growth. The few thousand Chinese Communist guerrillas who leap out from the jungle to harass the British with murder, sniping, sabotage, and arson cannot be found by any forthright clearing of forces out of the country. This is especially the case since the Communists are not fighting a war either. They are conducting a liberation.

On their side the Communists of Malaya are mostly Chinese by race, language, and national origin. There are some Malays and a few Indians,

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but these do not amount to much. The Communists are organized into the Malayan Races Liberation Army, called MRLA for short. The bases of this army consist of camps accommodating from half a dozen to several hundred men. These camp are logically supplied from within British territory. The actual Chinese who do the fighting make a point of trying to act like an army with real uniforms, genuine flags, and guns that really shoot.

Though the Malayan Communists are Chinese, they are not Chinese Communists. Chinese Communists are people with whom the British Empire is at peace. It is perfectly legal to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party in Singapore, though it is not legal to be a Chinese and a member of the Malayan Communist Party. Therefore, the Chinese Communists who are not Chinese Communists, and who aren't very Malayan either, are fighting a Britain which is at peace with Communist China.

Their chief tactics are what ignorant Americans would call murder and arson.

Rubber, unfortunately for the British, burns very readily and a great deal of the effort of the MRLA has been centered on the burning of stocks of sheet rubber. When I was in Singapore last summer they burned up several million dollars' worth in a fire which built up a cloud with a distressing resemblance to an atomic bomb explosion. When the Communists are not burning rubber they are shooting people. They prefer to shoot soldiers, but they will also shoot children, women, or anyone else handy. They particularly enjoy torturing informers to death inexpertly but slowly.

LET us look at this war again. Five thousand Chinese plus or minus are committing as many murders as they can and setting as many fires as they can in order to destroy British rule in a territory which is solidly under British military, naval, and air con-

trol. They have frightened a large part of the local Chinese population into an attitude of neutrality or silence. Opposing them are many times their number of British regulars, local militia, police, plantation guards, and other armed men. The anti-Communists try to find the Communists and then arrest them according to the best British standards of good police procedure. When they have to they even shoot them, but they do not do what the Chinese Communists do in China—take hostages. Nor do they do what both the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek did against Communists at other times in China—take mass reprisals.

The guerrilla forces in Malaya are Chinese and they are Communist. They do not appear to be the Mao Tse-tung variety. Their tactics and weapons derive much more from British training given them during the war as part of the underground anti-Japanese campaign than from anything Communist armed forces have learned in the struggles within China itself. The local Communists are fighting a war along the standard Moscow pattern for guerrillas, but they are doing so under immense logistical and communications handicaps.

Singapore looks close to China on a map of the world, but it would not be much easier for Mao Tse-tung's land forces to walk from China to Singapore than it would for Peron's land forces to march overland from Argentina to Nicaragua.

From the United States the Far East seems to be all one piece. It is only locally that one realizes the immensity of the natural barriers. Only in Singapore is one forced to remember that the Japanese troops which conquered Singapore from the landward side were not brought to Malaya overland, but by ships, and dumped ashore along the peninsula not too far from their final points of attack. The prospects of overland Chinese Communist reinforcements from Mao's Red China are virtually nil.

General Briggs is a real individualist, a man of bold and unorthodox military thinking, who reminded me in some ways of Stilwell or Lawrence of Arabia. Faced with a war that is not a war, against enemies who commit murder, opposed by an army without a government and supported, not by one government, but by more different British governments than he

could count, General Briggs is meeting the Communist attack with a counterattack as weird as it is effective. He is waging what might be called sociological warfare (I'm sure he would not like the term and I did not dare mention it to him).

General Briggs is applying the tactics of big-game hunting to the Communist guerrillas and he is cleaning them out by procedures more nearly resembling pest control than Clausewitzian concepts of strategy. In order to destroy the enemy he is breaking up the nesting places of the pests.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese squatters have moved to inaccessible villages in remote parts of the jungle. These squatter villages have neither British law, nor British police, nor British health services, nor British postal connections, nor British schools. (Of course, all these British services would be supplied by Malay sultans, but we can leave that complication aside and refer the interests of the reader to that fascinating document, *Annual Report on the Federation of Malaya, 1949* (printed at the Government Press by H. T. Ross, Government Printer, Kuala Lumpur, 1950, price \$5.00 or 7s.)

These outlying villages form the prime base of the anti-British guerrillas. The Chinese squatters can be intimidated precisely because British authority cannot protect them. Therefore General Briggs is proposing to absquat, unsquat, or desquat the squatter villages, whichever it is he has to do to a squatter village to make it an ex-squatter village. One of his chief weapons is cadastral—that's a term I never saw in a military dictionary before. It consists of giving land titles to the Chinese squatters, settling them legally and officially on new pieces of land which can be policed by the British. The resettlement project is proceeding along the lines of a coordinated police, civilian government, army and RAF campaign. Unless world communism moves in with measures of support, the British expect to clean up Malaya within two or three years at the latest.

**M**EANWHILE, strategic responsibility for this part of the world is carried on the British side by one of the Empire's most seasoned political leaders, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, and by one of the ablest of all British theater commanders, General Sir

John Harding. It is up to them to see that the Alice-in-Wonderland politics of the British Empire, plus Communism, plus the Far East, do not interfere too much with the consolidations effected under General Briggs's "operations." The British are learning some mighty valuable lessons on that strange and necessary art, "How to Stay Alive Despite Guerrillas in Your Neighborhood." The British civilians and the pro-British Chinese and Malay foremen on the plantations are showing inventiveness and heroism in avoiding the Chinese youths who like to shoot people in the back at dusk. It is nothing, for example, to see a British woman driving a Ford V-8 which has been armored at home until it looks like a cockroach-sized tank. The British planters have to conduct virtually a reconnaissance patrol to collect their precious rubber sap from the trees, but they are collecting it. From the prices currently quoted on the New York market for rubber, it is well worth anyone's while to go out on patrol to get this precious juice.

Everyone is making money. I was even told in Singapore that some of the most enthusiastic friends of the Communists cannot resist sympathizing with Mao on the one hand while they build up large balances of Malayan dollars with the other. Peace and war, murder and infantry, prosperity and terror—all these seem to go hand in hand in Malaya.

The British are learning how to patrol communications lines in settled areas with small bodies of police and troops. They are learning how to stage response raids. They are learning to hunt enemies who are so scarce and previous that they must be hunted one by one. Someone once said that the only beast more dangerous than the tiger was man: the British are having to learn the lessons of tactical insecurity within the framework of profound strategic security. Communism has bred a generation of human tigers in Malaya. I am afraid this is not the last place nor the last time that democratic soldiers will try to fight a war against people who don't believe in waging war, but who would much rather commit ordinary murder and arson instead. The fight in Malaya is a long fight and it is a fight for keeps. The British will win, and the *how* of their winning may become one of our most valuable codes of military training and doctrine.

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
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# RADAR HELPS THE ARTILLERY HELP THE DOUGHBOY

Major H. P. Rand

*Enemy mortars can be located accurately in a very few minutes by radar with the use of an automatic plotter technique developed by the Artillery. Here's how it works and what it will do.*

THE radar has capabilities of great usefulness to field artillery. It is a target-finder and a target-locator. It can be used to adjust fire and assist in survey operations. In 1945 radar sections were authorized in all divisional light battalions and in observation battalions. The full usefulness of radar to field artillery has not yet been attained. New types of sets designed for artillery use and new techniques should improve its effec-

tiveness to an ever larger degree. As the war in Korea has shown again, the mortar is still one of the worst obstacles in the path of the attacking infantryman. In World War II mortar fire caused more infantry casualties than any other weapon. Both ground and air observation posts rarely find mortar locations because they are usually well defiled and make little flash and noise. The mortar installation is small, manned by very few men.

By use of an automatic plotter a technique has been developed that puts fire on an enemy mortar within

three to four minutes after its first round has been "seen" by the radar. Experience has shown that at least half of all mortar rounds fired within the zone of observation of radar sets will be detected by the operator. So counterfire can be expected to fall on a hostile mortar at least by the time its crew could complete a will-adjust mission; it is more likely to get there late in the adjustment phase or early in the fire-for-effect phase of its mission.

After one round has been detected, the radar locks onto the next round and tracks it automatically, and re-

MAJOR H. P. RAND, Artillery, is a member of the Department of Observation, The Artillery School at Fort Sill.

cords the height, slant range, and azimuth on the automatic plotter. Figure 1 shows a typical mortar plot. By using a section of a parabola as a template, the partial plot is then extended back from the pickup point to the ground location of the mortar (the trade word is "extrapolated"). With a scale the data are then read off from this extended plot (Figure 2). The data are interpreted—where necessary—for errors in altitude by checking the location found against any available contoured map. As soon as corrections have been made, the location of the mortar is relayed to the fire direction center where a fire-for-effect mission is placed on the coordinates so reported. Thus there is no prior adjustment. Surprise fire is laid on the enemy mortar without it.

In a large number of experimental shoots at Fort Sill the average error in locating mortars by radar has been found to be thirty-five to forty yards. Considering the covering attained with a 105mm howitzer battery alone, this will give satisfactory results. When possible battalion missions are preferable. Then the mortar would certainly be silenced with a good chance of damage to the weapon and its crew.

For top speed, all firing data except deflection, site and elevation should be prearranged. It could well be SOP that whenever the radar locates a mortar, it would send the words "mortar mission" to the fire direction




FIGURE 1. A typical mortar plot

center which would relay this message to the battery or batteries to fire. A prearranged number of rounds of prearranged charge and fuze could then be prepared, to be fired as soon as the rest of the fire command comes

through. Prearrangement of charge is possible because mortars are normally located from 200 to 2,000 yards of the front lines.

In rare circumstances one of the three batteries might be designated to fire missions for the radar direct. The fire direction center would monitor the conversation between radar and firing battery by radio or telephone, whichever is used. Instead of reading an azimuth off the scale the graduations can be marked with a grease pencil to read the deflection direct. By having a graphical firing table at the radar, with the battery's corrections marked on it, the radar can send deflection, site and elevation to the battery. Again, all other elements of the firing command are prearranged. But an accurate check of the mortar location must be made with reference to the existing front lines, or locations of friendly elements near infiltrating hostile troops that may set up mortars in rear of the expected front lines. This check can be made at fire direction center or at the radar or the battery—wherever the latest





FIGURE 2. Data are read from the extended plot

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information of the infantry is available. Battalion control is not lost since the S-3 can cancel any fire mission the radar sends to the firing battery, if he thinks it unsafe or if he has more important targets to fire at. This procedure would only be used in exceptional circumstances because whenever an enemy mortar is giving the infantry trouble, a concentration of at least battalion size is needed to knock out the mortar fast.

**W**HY not use the same technique for locating enemy artillery pieces? It can be done just as readily as for mortars. But the flatter the trajectory the less accuracy of the radar data. In extrapolating the plot from the pickup point of the projectile back to the ground location of the weapon, the horizontal distance travelled by a high-trajectory shell is much shorter than that of a flat-trajectory shell, and this adds a substantial source of error. As an aid to counterbattery work, however, the radar is certainly a welcome addition to other methods of location available to corps artillery. Even against flat-trajectory weapons it can find a new area from which fire is coming or confirm, for example, a shell-report location.

#### Improved Observed Firing Chart

**A**METHOD of constructing an improved observed firing chart with the help of radar is a fine innovation in fire direction technique. With the radar now a part of the division light artillery battalion, this should be a welcome addition to the repertory of S-3s.

Here it is necessary to know the location of the radar with respect to one of the three batteries. The requirements for a radar location are much the same as those for a howitzer battery, so the distance from radar to battery may be as little as 100 to 200 yards, making the survey problem very simple. After all three batteries have made a time registration on the battalion base point, the radar observes a high-burst registration fired near the base point by the battery with which it is tied in by survey. The radar computes a mean location of the six observed bursts. The data from the firing battery to the high burst are determined by applying the radar offset (or parallax). Comparing these data to the data fired will result in a graphical firing table setting and a


deflection correction. These in turn can be used to determine true data from each battery to the base point (by stripping the corrections from the registration data).

The following example shows the procedure:

High burst fired by Battery C with the following data: Charge 5; Deflection xxx (Azimuth 880); Site 300, Time 16.0; Elevation 301.

Average of radar readings on six rounds fired with these data: Azimuth 880; Range 5040; Angle of site: plus 28; Computed vertical interval: 138 yards.

Location of Battery C in relation to radar:



Applying this offset to radar data, we find the following data for Battery C to the high burst: Azimuth 884; Range 4990; Difference in altitude: plus 136 yards; Computed site: plus 30 mils.

Graphical firing table setting: Range 4990; Elevation 271; Time 16.0.

Deflection correction: Left 4 (from Azimuth 884 to Azimuth 880).

Adjusted data on base point:

Battery	Charge	Azimuth	Site	Time	Elevation
A	5	739	300	16.8	291
B	5	824	300	17.2	298
C	5	880	300	16.0	276

Using above GFT setting and deflection correction, the following "true" adjusted data are derived:

Bat.	Eleva-	Site	Range	Azi-	Altitude in
	tion			thum	relation to
					base point
A	286	305	5210	744	minus 23
B	294	304	5310	829	minus 19
C	271	305	4990	884	minus 23

The range, azimuth and difference in altitude are used to back-plot the batteries from arbitrarily assumed coordinates of the base point. By the addition of the high-burst registration, the observed firing chart is thus improved to a point where it becomes comparable to a survey chart in accuracy.

The methods described are only two of the many uses field artillery makes of the radar. As new equipment becomes available the radar will become a more and more invaluable adjunct to the field artillery in increasing the efficiency of its support in the combined-arms team.

# CEREBRATION

## Count the Cost of Custom-Tailored Alibis

THE fighting man, from doughfoot to army commander, never makes excuses. Alibis are ashes in his mouth. From the moment the commander's voice says, "Move out," and the leader shouts or whispers "Follow me," the doughfoot, according to his particular ability, slugs his guts out to get that next hill. The commander makes a similar effort. But somewhere along the line sometimes something breaks down.

Historians and military writers when faced with the nasty chore of describing a defeat, temporary or otherwise, invariably turn to the phrase, "the fog of war." It's a terrible phrase. But the scribes of great campaigns from Bibracte through Borodino to the Bulge have used it.

But future commanders will never benefit from experience if we encourage such an alibi and neatly bundle up our failures and label them "Fog of War."

When a subordinate commander does not report a failure or a temporary bogging down in his sector, then it is he who has failed, not his unit, and certainly not John Doughfoot. The next higher commander has failed too. He has never gained the trust of that subordinate commander. Reluctance to report failure is a failure of command. It is the stuff of which "fog of war" is concocted. It breeds future failure. You can prevent it in your outfit. You must.

Your staff can also produce "fog of war." Your staff is reluctant to report a temporarily bad situation because they hope things will soon brighten up a bit. Then your exec or chief of staff has failed. So have you, and the commander above you.

We learn nothing from lies. We learn nothing from experiences wrongly told because of command reluctance or failure to stick to the facts. You, I and every other leader can solve this problem now and for-

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

ever by personally demonstrating the absolute need for promptly reporting the true facts even when it hurts.

"The commander *alone* is responsible for all that unit does or *fails to do*. He cannot delegate this responsibility." This rule of command is prominently displayed in FM 100-5 (*Operations*). This commander's Bible goes on to say: "As much and possibly more may be learned by a study of failure as from a study of success. . . See the lessons of the defense of Pearl Harbor contained in the appendix."

A defeat is a defeat. Let's stick to the facts and banish the "fog of war" from all future reports and literature of war.

LIEUT. COL. HOWARD C. DELLERT  
Infantry

## Perfect Regiment— It Never Squawked

RECENTLY on maneuvers I saw the operation of a division headquarters war room, and there followed the movements of the three regiments.

Two were always driving forward with energy and determination and sometimes wanted to go ahead on their own in a manner much different from the division plan.

The third regiment went quietly where it was told. It didn't think up new ideas on how to win the war.

Two of the regimental commanders would come to division headquarters and tell the division commander that the staff was not doing right by them—that their own ideas were better. The third commander never

complained or even peeped; just followed the division plan.

All of the staff's trouble were with the two regiments and their commanders. The third regiment went quietly along without making any trouble.

That wasn't surprising. It was a simulated regiment.

Armies are made up of men. Good commanders are men—dynamic men.

The wheels of military operations don't turn on ball bearings without efforts or strain. There must be labor and revision of plans. There will always be the sparkle and conflict of personalities. There is no perfect unit, no perfect operation, no perfect commander—except the imaginary.

Tension and strain, sweat and swearing, pressure and improvisation, all are normal. The military man must meet them as a natural part of the ordered chaos of operations.

LIEUTENANT LEARNING

## Notes on the Body Military

To be good is noble, but to show others how to be good is even nobler, and no trouble.—PUDD'NHEAD WILSON.

APPROACH the problem of physical conditioning with some misgiving, for it is a touchy matter. The problem is a serious one, and we must recognize that the Army officer today faces a new situation. Fitness remains a necessity if the officer is to retain his effectiveness as a combat leader, but frequently his current job is terribly destructive of that fitness. Some fifteen or twenty years ago this was not so much the case; for example, in the Cavalry (if you'll pardon the expression) the daily military routine—to which was added polo, hunting, and occasional steeplechasing—required long sweating hours out of doors, and most of the line officers were sunburnt, lean, and soldierly. This tradition of fitness, I profoundly regret to say, has largely disappeared, with the important exception of the airborne troops. They have inherited the tradition and carry it on, to their enduring credit.

While practically everyone acknowledges that a combat officer should be physically fit, an appalling large number of those officers make no reasonable attempt to keep in shape. A few minutes in the hallways of the Pentagon will demonstrate the

truth of this. There are exceptions, of course—but a rear view of most of us inmates, paper-laden and agitated as we hurry down the corridors, is not likely to impress the casual observer as to the battleworthiness of the armed forces.

Some officers either ignore or shrug off the problem on the theory that in modern warfare it's brains, not brawn, that counts. It is to be hoped that the Korean fracas has gone a long way in exploding that idea. Brainpower is a priceless commodity in battle and should be assiduously cultivated, but it nevertheless remains one essential quality among many. Perhaps character, and all that it connotes, is the most important—but also vital is the quality of physical fitness. Lack of fitness frequently renders impotent the other qualities: a thoroughly exhausted man, in position of leadership, cannot think clearly, and his decisions are not to be trusted. Indeed, he will often fail to reach any decision at all; resolution and direct action are not characteristic of extreme fatigue.

Having posed the problem it is presumably the duty of the author to suggest a solution, while bearing in mind that the enormous requirements for paper work cannot be avoided.

It is probably not desirable to enforce a blanket type solution. Rather than the typical demand that "all officers will take two hours of exercise weekly" I suggest that the commander or his representative take the trouble to consider the case of each officer, separately. Several factors should be considered for each individual; age, current daily occupation, branch, and—most important—future military employment.

If I were doing it I should bend special effort towards keeping young-to-middle-age line officers (including engineers) in good shape, and have less regard for service officers. Among line officers I should be more concerned over the fitness of the top-flight officers than the mediocre. I would certainly vary, too, the types of exercise required: I should like infantry lieutenants to be proficient on good stiff obstacle courses, but I should settle with the regimental surgeon for a couple of rounds of golf weekly.

For a very large headquarters the problem is the most difficult but again it would seem desirable to tackle each individual case separate-

ly. Above all it is necessary for the chief of a staff section to recognize that day-to-day paper-wrangling is not the primary and ultimate task of a professional line officer, that the most important potential of that officer lies in command of troops in the field. This potential should not be lost in the press of the daily grind.

It is not reasonable to expect that a desk-bound officer will be able to get anything like regular exercise after work in the afternoon—for most of the year it is too dark, for one thing, and mowing the lawn once a week won't do. It is in the interests of the Government to make available a certain number of workday hours. An afternoon off once a week is better than nothing, but an hour and a half three or four times a week is much better if exercise facilities are immediately available.

The last idea immediately suggests squash or handball, or perhaps volleyball or basketball. Facilities for these are urgent requirements in the Army today, and we should make a strong try at getting them. Middle-aged officers can use them—when someone drags out the cliché about squash being slow death to a man over forty, I think it is fair to reply that the aim, in the Army, is to have a combat-fit officer at fifty as against a candidate for the Walla Walla Weekly Whitting Club at eighty. Naturally no man with a poor heart, or similar difficulty, should play squash or any other arduous game; common sense applies here as elsewhere.

Maybe the whole idea of this little essay can be summarized by the remark made by one of our truly first-class combat officers. Chided by his contemporaries for leaving the office one day for a couple of sets of tennis, he merely observed that he felt it to be his sacred military duty to take proper and continuing care of the taxpayers' body.

Some of us are gypping the socks off the taxpayers.

COL. HAMILTON H. HOWZE  
*Armor*

### **Pistol Packin' (UN) Policeman**

MOVIES and newspaper pictures from Korea that I have seen suggest that the pistol is making a comeback. When men are at close quarters with the enemy—frisking captives, examining apparently dead or injured

enemy soldiers, or cleaning out a captured pillbox—the pistol is a handy weapon, perhaps the handiest, to keep the enemy covered. It requires the use of only one hand and is a powerful hand-to-hand combat (the closer the hands the better) weapon.

It is pertinent to note that an astounding number of soldiers in Korea seem to have pistols. Why is this? We know that issue, normally, is extremely limited.

Perhaps it is the influence of the guerrilla and infiltration tactics of the Reds. Maybe the GI feels that he needs all the individual armament he can lug around to be on equal terms with such a close-in enemy.

Maybe the soldier has learned that it's too late to use a rifle or carbine when he feels the hot breath of a guerrilla on the back of his neck in the dark.

Some reports in the early stages of the war indicated that men were using their empty rifles as clubs in hand-to-hand combat. A pistol would have been a better last-resort weapon.

I saw a picture of a soldier in Korea armed with a tommy gun, grenades, pistol, and a knife. Pictures of captured guerrillas often show them with the same equipment, except in double quantities. Most Korean guerrillas appear to be walking arsenals.

This trend to the pistol—if such it is—affects nearly all phases of operations. No longer does the wireman jog along complacent in the knowledge that his carbine is in the wire-laying vehicle half a mile ahead of him. No, nowadays, he is alert for ambush and carries a pistol.

I have also noticed that a large number of pistols are being carried in shoulder holsters. Is this because of the quicker draw that's possible? Maybe though, it's because they're less in the way of other equipment. Obviously a pistol is more accessible in a shoulder holster than on the hip when you're ambushed while riding in a jeep.

If the trend is to the pistol isn't it about time to make our pistol conform to the job it will have? We changed it from a smooth-shooting .38 revolver to a blasting, bucking, hard-hitting .45 almost forty years ago to perform a certain type of mission against a fanatical, bolo-wielding enemy.

Present and prospective enemies of this country are masters at guerrilla and infiltration tactics. So we need

a pistol that will give individual protection at close quarters.

Almost all other armies use smaller-caliber pistols. Maybe it's conservation of materials. Maybe they are more convenient and accurate. Most law-enforcement agents, and their enemies who live outside the law, use caliber .38 revolvers. In Korea we are fighting men who live outside the law of the United Nations so maybe the .38 is in order as a military weapon.

LT. COL. ELMER WHITMAN  
Artillery

### Throw a Nickel On the Drum

OFF the battlefield the most gratifying achievement of an officer or non-com is to salvage a soldier who has been given up for lost. Each of us harbors a secret conviction that there is some way we can handle the most obstinate and derelict case—even though it has defied every solution tried by others.

Our junior officers and the non-coms have been repeatedly told that each is responsible for the shortcomings of his men. He does well to start with the premise that "there is no such thing as a bad soldier." But when a higher commander subscribes blindly to this pat bit of triteness, you begin to get into trouble.

Men and women experienced in human rehabilitation know that there are "hard cases" which just can't be helped. It's an unpleasant fact, but certain persons, who by all the rules should be good citizens, just never make the grade.

Such men occasionally get into the Army—or Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. In our attempts at rehabilitating them we should never delude ourselves into expecting hundred per cent success. The man who says he never met a soldier he couldn't straighten out is a fool, a liar, or totally without leadership experience. Probably all three.

The worst damage the incurable "reformer" does is often to the other men in the unit and to the subordinate commanders. There's a limit to how long the men in an outfit should have to see a misfit mollycoddled at their expense. The company commander, platoon leader and noncoms will see their judgment overruled by higher headquarters just so many times before they lose the self-confi-

dence which marks an effective leader.

In our attempts at rehabilitation we should estimate the situation just as we would any military undertaking. First we ask whether we can devote the necessary time and special effort to Private Murgatroyd without neglecting our other responsibilities. How many "last chances" can we give Private Murgatroyd before we admit defeat? What effect will the tolerance and special consideration we give him have on the other men of the company who may well feel that Murgatroyd is allowed to get away with things for which they would "get the book"? Finally, if Murgatroyd is unable to adapt himself to this outfit, is a transfer to another outfit where the work is more to his liking or where the standards are lower justified?

Let's look at a case that we assume is not fictional. About a year ago Captain Able took command of a rifle company which had been the despair of previous commanders at company, battalion and regimental levels. The unit led the regiment in VD, AWOLs, court-martial convictions, company punishments, and all the other indices which are easy to plot on a chart.

There happened to be an officer in this outfit with whom Able had served before and whose opinion he valued.

"The only thing wrong is six foul balls who cause all the trouble," Lieutenant Baker told him. "We had 368 and 369 board cases drawn up on all of them six months ago—after we had done all we could to make soldiers out of them. Headquarters decided, however, that there was nothing wrong with these men. 'You just don't understand the boys,' they told us. 'And besides a lot of boards makes the battalion look bad.' So we're supposed to make soldiers out of them—if it ruins all of us and the company too."

It didn't take Able long to see that these six were indeed incurables. Most of them had records of court-martial convictions and all but one wanted to get out of the Infantry—and lost no time in letting this be known to the new company commander. But they had also mastered the 8-ball's technique of "snowing" a higher commander or an IG. And they had collected quite a circle of admirers in the company, after "beating the system" for so long.

Several months and one battalion commander later the company not

only looked good on the fancy little charts in everybody's headquarters, but was winning regimental competitions and getting all sorts of commendations.

What had happened? The six 8-balls had been finally dismissed from the service under Circulars 368 and 369.

If this seems like a superficial remedy which did no more than eliminate certain recalcitrants, it had a much more significant effect—one that you can't plot on a graph.

When the six were banished the officers and noncoms were free of the disciplinary and administrative load imposed by a small group of worthless men. They had time to do something constructive about the company. For the first time in months they had the initiative.

After the six were gone there were fewer reprimands from headquarters for things which hadn't been done, and more commendations for doing things which other companies hadn't gotten around to doing.

There was the happier relationship between men and leaders which can exist only in the outfit which knows it is a little better than the one next door.

The final effect was that men who had a tendency to "goof off" were shown that it didn't pay; men who believed in playing the game saw that it was worthwhile. The men began to find the first sergeant a hell of a lot easier to get along with.

I have dwelt on the failures that can't be rehabilitated because there has been more than enough emphasis on the successes. I certainly don't recommend the slightest relaxation of efforts to make good soldiers out of "special cases" by understanding treatment of first offenders, by exhausting all possible methods to get men to respond to fair treatment, or by using sterner methods on men who cannot be reasoned with.

Experience has convinced me, however, that there is such a thing as a man who cannot economically be made into a good soldier. We'll never reach maximum efficiency until commanders accept this fact and are realistic in their attitude toward rehabilitating men in whom company leaders have abandoned hope.

After all, we're only troop leaders, not alchemists.

CAPT. MARK M. BOATNER  
*Infantry*

## NEWS OF THE SERVICES

### Manpower & Money

As the tide in Korea turned against the United Nations forces it became clear that the U.S. rate of rearmament would have to be increased in size and in tempo. Whether it would be total mobilization or something less depended upon future developments. But the start that had been made since 25 June was plainly insufficient.

Early in December the Commander in Chief asked Congress to give the Department of Defense an additional \$16.8 billion, bringing the total defense budget for fiscal 1951 to \$41.8 billion.

Of this sum the Army will get a large part for weapons, vehicles and production facilities.

The 1 December strength goal of the services—almost certainly to be increased shortly—were for the Army to reach 1,264,000 by the end of June. At the same time the Air Force would increase to 651,095, the Navy to 688,791, and the Marine Corps to 16,155. The total would be 2.7 million.

In his message to Congress requesting the additional appropriation, the Commander in Chief noted that the money would permit the Government "to make the fastest possible progress in increasing our strength. This action will permit us to go ahead at once to step up rapidly the size of the armed forces and the rate of military training. It will permit us to go ahead at once to increase rapidly the rate of production of planes, tanks, and other military equipment. At the same time, we can be going ahead with plans for such further expansion as may be necessary . . . ."

That statement suggests that there will be a steady raising of goals as the armed forces and the nation become prepared to handle and absorb greater armed strength and increased production for war.

### Combat Badges

The Army, the press revealed, is considering authorization of a badge, similar to the Combat Infantryman's Badge, for soldiers in the other combat arms. It was reported that commanders of combat units in Korea have reported that the morale of men

of other arms would be substantially boosted if such a badge was authorized.

### Training Progress

The training tempo in the training divisions and the combat units in the U.S. was speeding up under the carefully worked out and supervised program of Army Field Forces. General Clark himself was giving close attention to it and as the rate of induction of draftees moved up the Army's ability to handle and use them increased.

The National Guard outfits federalized in September had gone through their shake-down period and were engaged in the training program devised to prepare them for combat by early summer.

The newly reactivated 4th Infantry Division at Fort Benning was going through the process of building up from cadre strength.

In preparation for the appearance of additional troops in Europe, the Army announced the formation of Seventh Army under the command of Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy.

The two airborne divisions in ZI were training and receiving quotas of new men.

The summer of 1951 would be a busy one for the Army. Extensive maneuvers and exercises for the units now in training are in the planning stage. Two of them have been mentioned in the press. One, "Lone Star," in Texas, will doubtless see the 2d Armored Division in its first sizable maneuvers since the end of the war. Another, "Timberline," will be staged from Camp Carson, high in the Colorado Rockies. In this connection General Clark, while on an inspection trip at Camp Carson, was quoted as saying that three or four weeks of mountain training should be given all ground combat forces.

### Schools Re-locate

The three service schools now at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., got new homes into which they will move in order to make room for the Army War College, now crowded in with the C&GS at Fort Leavenworth.

The Armed Forces Information School will move to Fort Slocum, out-

side New York City, in what appears to be a happy choice because it will give the school access to New York City's host of expert journalists and publicists.

The Army Security Agency School will move to Fort Devens, Mass., more recently occupied by the 7th Infantry Regiment, now in Korea with the 3d Division.

The Chaplains' School will also move to Fort Slocum.

## INFANTRY

### Airborne Booms

The two weeks that was cut from the basic airborne course at the Infantry School in August hasn't affected the quality or number of students completing it. A recent check showed that 87.91 per cent of the students enrolling in the shorter three-week courses have completed the jumping instruction satisfactorily. That figure is 10.95 per cent better than the rate of completion in the previous two and one-half years.

Also the number of older men graduating from the jump school is increasing, thus pretty well destroying the myth that "parachuting is for kids." Since the three-week course was started three general officers, 11 colonels, 80 lieutenant colonels and 94 majors have completed the course.

Since the Airborne Department eliminated glider training from its work it has added heavy equipment drop techniques. The emphasis is on speed in getting bigger loads onto the drop zone.

### Antitank Film

Training Film 7-1681 "Infantry Weapons Against Tanks" has been distributed to Signal Corps film libraries. This film, made at the Infantry School, demonstrates the use of antitank weapons available to the infantryman. It is excellent medium for instilling confidence in the Doughboy who may not be too sure that he is capable of knocking out a heavily-gunned 30-ton steel monster.

### The New Quarterly

The January issue of the *Infantry Quarterly* will soon be distributed.

Among other articles it will feature a description of the Army's new 2½-ton truck, the superiority of the heavy-drop technique over glider-borne loads in airborne operations, and a description of how to install a SCR-300 radio in an L-5 air craft. For the troop leader there is a piece on the problems of the Infantry-tank team commander (be he doughfoot or tanker), another on how to plan and execute a patrol behind enemy lines. The bug who likes to play with statistics and formulae will find his meat in an article which sets up a formula for calculating the fire power of various weapons and units and compares the firepower of our present infantry division with those of the past.

### New Training Literature

The Infantry School has several new packets and special texts available. They include:

Packet S-6 "Combat Intelligence";

\$1.00

Special Text 31-20-1 "Operations Against Guerrilla Forces" 30c

Special Text 28-82-1 "105mm Rifle"; 30c

Special Text 23-21-1 "3.5-inch Rocket Launcher"; 25c

Two new field manuals—FM 22-5 "Drill and Ceremonies" and FM 21-5 "Military Training"—are now available. Another new one of current interest is FM 21-8 "Military Training Aids."

## ARTILLERY

### New Artillery Fuze

Three new fuzes for use with field artillery weapons are now standard. They are the M500, M501, and the M51A5.

The M500 and M501 replace the time and superquick fuzes M55 and M54. The M501 differs only slightly from the M500 and is for use with such special ammunition as base ejection smoke and illuminating shell.

Both of these fuzes are essentially the same as the M67 mechanical time fuze which has been in use for several years with medium and heavy artillery. The principal change is the addition of an impact element, which eliminates duds when the time element malfunctions. The M500 and M501 are for use with light as well as medium and heavy calibers.

The M51A5 is for use by all FA weapons when quick or delay action is desired. This fuze has a delay element of improved design.

The Department of Gunnery, TAS,

currently is running a series of tests to determine the relative efficiency of various kinds of fuze action when used in direct-fire, close-in defense of battery positions against personnel.

### Schools & Courses

Two revised gunnery extension courses have recently been "service tested" at TAS by Reserve officers who have been recalled to EAD. The purpose was to discover "bugs" in the courses, check validity, and the allocation of credit hours. The sub-courses, which should be ready for student distribution in February 1951, are: Subcourses 20-9FA, "Firing Battery," and Subcourse 30-13FA, "Unobserved Fire." Both incorporate the target grid procedure.

Artillery motor sergeants are being graduated from TAS at the rate of 85 every eight weeks. The next group will complete the course 30 January 1951.

These courses are of eight weeks' duration and are designed for men who already are qualified automotive mechanics of RA, NG, and ORC components.

The Artillery Automotive Maintenance courses at TAS are getting a double play. The quota of students is set at 40, but about 80 are attending each course. Although the courses run 15 weeks, a new class is begun each month. Due to the large attendance, it is planned to begin new courses every two weeks, starting in February.

Three new courses for Field Artillery Intelligence Chiefs (MOS 1705) and for FA Operations Chiefs (MOS 1704) will be initiated by TAS beginning in January 1951. The course will be of eight weeks' duration. However, the second class will start in February and the third in March.

The first combined Operator-Maintenance course for FA and AA ballistic meteorological personnel was initiated at TAS, Fort Sill, late in November. New courses will start monthly.

Future courses will consist of 11 weeks of training as Ballistic Meteorological Operator; followed by 10 weeks of training as Maintenance Technician on electronic type of Meteorological equipment.

Two AAA Weapons Maintenance courses and one FA Weapons Maintenance courses are currently being conducted by the Department of Materiel, TAS. The former are 18 weeks long and the FA course runs for 15½ weeks.

The next AAA course will start 22 January 1951 and be completed 14 April 1951. The next FA group starts 5 February 1951 and gets through the course 24 May 1951.

The 20-week Radio Maintenance Course has been shortened to 12 weeks. This was made possible by reducing the number of radio sets taught from 11 to three. Students will receive five weeks' instruction in electrical and radio fundamentals, followed by seven weeks on the theory and maintenance of the AN/GRC-9, SCR-608, and SCR-619. AA students learn the SCR-188 instead of the SCR-619.

The emphasis is now on the principles of radio maintenance so that graduates will be able to maintain the new equipment without additional schooling. The prerequisites for this condensed course are high: aptitude area IX score of 110, or equivalent, and an expressed desire to attend the course. A new course starts every six weeks.

The Communication Officer and Communication Chief course at TAS are reduced in length from 17½ weeks to 12. This has been done by removing from the course much of the work on electrical and radio fundamentals.

The prerequisites for these courses are relatively high. A prospective student of the Communication Chief course should be a noncommissioned officer with communication experience and must have a standard score of 100 or higher on the area aptitude IX tests.

It has been found that many students arriving at the Artillery School for communication courses do not fulfill the prerequisites. They quickly fall behind and have great difficulty in completing the courses. It is suggested that all unit commanders in both regular and civilian components make certain that students attending courses are fully qualified.

The next Communication Officer and Communication Chief courses both begin 3 January 1951, with the second two classes starting 6 February 1951.

The Artillery School has issued a new Subcourse 40-5, "Guided Missiles—General." This new course covers the history of guided missiles, propulsion systems, guiding systems, launching systems and lethal devices. Proposed tactical employment and tactical organization also are covered.

Being a common artillery sub-course, it is designed for officers with

either FA or AA specialties. Currently, the completion of this course will be accepted as a substitute for Subcourse 50-9AAA, "Employment of Guided Missiles," in the 50-series.

Courses of instruction in the Sound and Flash section, Department of Observation, TAS, now include a rapid system of processing sound time intervals. The system is called the "Calculator Method," and is devised to take time intervals from subbases of any length, correct them for temperature and wind, and convert to an equivalent four-second time interval. The advantages of the new system are: It permits the selection of microphone positions in a favorable acoustical location; gives the commander a more elastic sound ranging base to fit the zone of action or varied terrain features; provides a method of making rapid weather corrections; eliminates the use of non-standard correction charts; and eliminates the need for time scales other than a four-second time scale.

### Radar Mortar Locating

Previously employed techniques for locating mortars without the use of the automatic plotter being slow and difficult, the Radar section of the Department of Observation, TAS, has developed two new techniques. These have proved themselves to be of equal accuracy and reliability to locations with the automatic plotter.

In both methods, range and azimuth readings are taken to the projectile at critical elevations during flight while the radar set is tracking the projectile automatically.

### "Very" Heavy Artillery

Recent information from Army Field Forces indicate an additional classification for field artillery. In addition to the light, medium, and heavy types, we now have heavy artillery. The 8-inch gun and 240-mm howitzer belong in this category.

### Leadership Classes

The Department of General Subjects has adopted the group or committed discussion method of instruction for its classes in Leadership. Long-used in higher echelon military schools, its adoption at a branch school is a new departure and school officials are well pleased with results.

Classes are broken down into groups of 14 officers and are assigned separate conference rooms. Topics range through actual combat experiences, occupation problems and other

special leadership problems. At the conclusion of separate group discussions, the whole class is reassembled and representatives of the various sections present their group's solution. While there are no "school solutions" to the various problems, there are certain fundamental principles to be followed. The committee system of instruction in this case not only permits much greater student participation but stimulates individual thinking.

### Radio Channel Designations

The Communication Department of TAS is advocating a change in the nomenclature of the radio channels in the infantry, artillery, and armor in order to make them uniform for all three arms, and to standardize on the nomenclature which is most descriptive of the channels being used.

The department has recommended that this matter be included in the proposed agenda for the Commandants' conference which is to be held at Fort Leavenworth, in January.

At the present time, the "Command Channel (FM)" of the Infantry is called the "Control Channel" by the Artillery, and the "Command Channel (Voice)" in the Armor.

The "Command Channel (AM)" of the Infantry is the "Command Channel" of the Artillery—but the "Command Channel" (CW) of the Armor.

These differences in terminology for channels, which are used for similar if not identical purposes, have caused considerable confusion.

### Antenna Demonstrator

The Communication Department, TAS, is currently employing a very high frequency (150 megacycle) antenna demonstrator. It is capable of showing the effects of antenna position, antenna design, line of sight operation, and reflection fading.

It is especially adapted for indoor classes. Organizations or individuals who are interested may receive technical data concerning the demonstrator by contacting the Communications Department, TAS.

### New "Ham" Station

Amateur radio is available to students attending Communications courses at TAS through W5FOM (MARS-A5FOM) — a ham's dream station.

Licensed in the name of Colonel James E. Holley, Director, Department of Communication, W5FOM is equipped for any type of operation.

Regular daily radiotelephone schedules are held with stations all over the U. S., for exchange traffic. Fourth Army Area CW nets are held thrice weekly, on a MARS frequency, contacting Fort Sam Houston, Fort Hood, and Fort Sill. In addition, weekly MARS drills during evening hours are held, with A5FOM as NCS for the state of Oklahoma.

Frequently W5FOM checks into the Oklahoma Amateur Traffic net on 80 meters, and during peak periods has handled over 500 messages per month.

The main equipment consists of a one kilowatt CW and 'fone transmitter, a BC-610 transmitter (500 watts), two super-pro receivers, and a 10-20 meter rotary beam, lower frequencies.

Any licensed amateur operator may use this station. In one instance, a soldiers' wife talked from her quarters on the Ft. Sill post to her daughter in Panama.

The Department of the Army encourages Amateur Radio because it provides a great pool of trained operators and technicians, available in national emergencies.

### Shorts

**Soldier's Guide.** The final edit of the Soldiers' Guide, FM 21-13, was recently completed by the Editorial group, Division of Training Publications, TAS, and the publication is now in the hands of OCAFF for approval. Publication is expected about February 1951.

**War On—School's In.** New enrollments in extension courses of The Artillery School have jumped to about 500 per month. The Korean war and the activity of augmentation units are credited with this increased interest. The number of lessons graded weekly is now running around 2500.

**Artillery Insignia???** Each month just before we go to press, we check with the Pentagon to find out if they've decided on the new insignia for Artillerymen. To date, the answer remains the same, "It's under study."

### ORDNANCE Ammunition Control

To supervise and control the Army's growing ammunition requirements an Ordnance Ammunition Center was established at the Joliet Arsenal in Illinois.

During World War II ammunition supervision was handled from Washington.

## Amphibious Warfare

The December **Marine Corps Gazette** has a lengthy announcement, almost a synopsis, of a coming book, *The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War*, which is a study "of the Marine Corps' development of the doctrine of amphibious war in the period between the two world wars and of the application of that doctrine in the Pacific." The book is the result of lengthy study and research by a group of professors working under the direction of Princeton University. It is financed by the Marine Corps but is neither an official history nor an operational study. The work was directed by two Princeton professors—Philip A. Crowl and Jeter A. Isely—who also did the writing.

Crowl and Isely found that "Marine Corps doctrine was so sound that it endured the period 1939-1945 with only minor changes." They warn that the differences between the landing at Guadalcanal and Okinawa were not due to shortcomings in doctrine but "rather in means of putting that doctrine into effect." The "near disaster" at Guadalcanal and the "flaws" revealed at Tarawa "were in techniques or lack of equipment rather than in doctrine," they write.

In the **Gazette** pre-view, Crowl and Isely get away from their subject a bit and peer into the future. They hold that the belief that large-scale amphibious operations are obsolete is dangerous and they also take a dim view of the theory that airborne operations "offer a practical and economical substitute for landing troops on hostile shores." However, the authors are reassured by the record of the Marines. "If the past record of the Marine Corps is any indication of future performance, the world can be reasonably assured that such a doctrine will be provided," they write.

The book which will appear later this winter may be a landmark in military studies. It should get the critical attention of a wide audience.

In another **Gazette** article, Chief Warrant Officer Lionel J. Gelinas describes the Marine Corps' enlisted promotion policy as the "fairest method yet devised." It entails five

steps which seem rather detailed to an old soldier who expected all promotions under the first three grades to come at the whim (not actually, it just seemed like it) of his company and regimental commanders.

## Tanks in Korea

**Armor** continues to be a beautiful magazine, tastefully illustrated and typographically pleasing. In addition some of its articles are very much on the ball. In the current November-December issue there is an analysis by Lt. Col. George B. Pickett, Jr., on the use of tanks in Korea. It makes these points:

- ¶ American officers are prone to under-estimate the mobility of tanks;
- ¶ Tried and tested infantry-tank tactics are unknown to too many officers.
- ¶ Too many officers don't know much about armor organization; this is illustrated by recounting an order attaching "five tanks to the \_\_\_\_ Infantry." No one, the author writes, would ever think of "attaching 203 riflemen to a tank battalion." (Incidentally, the tank commander sent a whole platoon of tanks, not just five.)
- ¶ Some men assigned to tanks in Korea had never fired a tank gun.
- ¶ Maintenance difficulties were partially due to the inexperience of crews but this led to Ordnance officers suggesting "combat crews" and "ground crews" similar to the Air Force. Costly in manpower? the author asks. And he answers that actually it might save manpower and keep more tanks in operation. Another solution would be mobile ordnance maintenance teams.
- ¶ Air power can certainly keep enemy armor from moving in daylight but when the tanker becomes adept at camouflage and concealment he can keep his losses down. In one 10-day period our Air Force claimed 13 enemy tanks destroyed in a given area. A bit later when our forces overran that area they found two North Korean tanks and both

had been knocked out by an American tank battalion. "Maybe," writes Col. Pickett, "the NKs bothered to drag off the thirteen hulls and hide them." He discounts as wishful thinking the theory that the rocket-firing airplane spells doom for the tank.

¶ The "super-bazooka" does pack a wallop but it's "mostly for infantry morale. When infantry and tanks work together properly no enemy bazooka-man is going to have much chance to ply his trade," Col. Pickett suggests. North Korean infantry-tank tactics were not good.

## Horseflesh

**Armor** reflects its parent, the *Cavalry Journal*, in an appeal by Major Prentice G. Morgan that we not forget the horse. "There may be a horse in our future even if we are not riding it," Major Morgan writes somewhat pensively. He is speaking of Soviet Cavalry and suggests that our Aggressor forces have at least one squadron of "real flesh and blood horse-mounted cavalry" to give us experience against the enemy horse cavalry we may meet on the battlefield.

## Combined Operations

The December **Military Review**, publication of the Command and General Staff College, has a number of high-level articles, as is customary, among them a piece on "Command in a Combined Theater of Operations," which makes the point that "any organization, no matter how well conceived and designed, will stand the strains of war only to the extent of the type and kind of people in it." This means that success in a combined operation is cooperation.

In "Ammunition Supply in the Battle for Brest," Dr. Roland G. Rupenthal of the Office of Military History, Department of the Army, investigates the shortages of ammunition that hampered the VIII Corps operations in August 1944. It became such a vexing problem that even SHAEF investigated.

# World Perimeters

COLONEL C. H. LANZA

## NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

**West European Army.** On 24 October the United States promised to grant \$12 billion by 1953 to rearm the Western European allies and to contribute from five to ten U. S. divisions to western Europe's defenses. General Bradley urged immediate action in rearming Western Europe. It was better to act while peace prevailed, than to wait until the enemy attacked, and then improvise a defense. Other Allies are to spend a total of \$8 billion. France is to manufacture some war matériel, notwithstanding American advice that it would be cheaper and quicker to obtain needed equipment and weapons from this country.

The Washington Conference of Defense Ministers split on questions of urgency, and on the question of rearming Germany. France expressed the belief that there was still time for further study, and that she would agree to rearming Germany only up to units not exceeding regiments. No other ally agreed with France. They believed the situation called for immediate action, and that German rearming should include divisions. All allies agreed that Germany should have neither a general staff, naval nor air forces. The conference adjourned on 30 October—deadlocked.

**German reaction.** On 8 November, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany stated that Germany would make an adequate contribution to the defense of Western Europe provided it was given equal rights as a member of a coalition strong enough to give reasonable prospect of deterring Soviet aggression. German elections, and statements by German leaders, indicate that the majority of the people are unwilling to fight with the West unless Germany is granted independence, complete. It makes no sense to Germans to fight for a continuation of rule by their present masters. If they have to remain under foreign

domination they will not fight for one set of masters rather than another.

The strategical situation in Germany today is similar to that of 1811. In 1806, Germany had been crushed and disarmed by France. France then occupied all of Germany and reorganized it politically about the same as the Allies did after their victory in 1945. In each case, after five years war with Russia loomed as a possibility, and the question of rearming Germany arose. In 1811 France did rearm Germany. A German army participated in the invasion of Russia in 1812. Germans fought well, but without enthusiasm. When the situation became bad for France, Germans shifted and joined Russia. The German troops who were rearmed in 1811 and 1812 were the nucleus of the German army which appeared at Waterloo in 1815, defeated the French and marched on into Paris.

The French General Staff hasn't forgotten that lesson. It doesn't trust Germany.

**Factors governing alliances.** Between two hostile forces of approximately the same strength, one of which is an alliance and the other a single Power, the latter has the advantage. Alliances formed during a war consist of nations fearing a common enemy, or nations wishing to join the winning side in order to secure expected benefits upon the conclusion of the war. This type of alliance usually dissolves rapidly after the war is over, and may split into hostile segments over dissatisfaction of the war settlement.

Alliances formed during peace are usually organized by some major sponsoring power. Smaller nations join in order to receive economic benefits (loans, grants, etc.), or for fear of economic reprisals, or to secure territorial gains through the expected war. This type of alliance is weak, and is liable to fall apart if the sponsoring power appears to be losing.

## Factors affecting the NATO.

This alliance has twelve members confronted by a single strong power. It is hard to handle. Besides differences about rearming Germany the war in Korea has modified European public opinion as to the wisdom of the alliance.

First reaction had been stimulation. The United States had proved that it would fight Communism. Enthusiasm forced measures to rearm the United States and Western Europe. As long as the war in Korea was favorable to the United States the other members of the alliance went along with it and its recommendations.

With the entry of China into the war a minority arose arguing that this might well bring about World War III before Western Europe was prepared. It is known that the principal clause of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 February 1950 reads as follows:

"In the event of one of the agreeing parties being subjected to attack by Japan, or any state allied with her, thus finding itself in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military or other aid with all means at its disposal."

China (and the USSR) has accused the United States of using Japan as a base, of utilizing Japanese war vessels (claim to have sunk a Jap minesweeper operating off Korea), of having two Japanese generals, naming them, advising the U. S. Army in Korea, all of which amount to an alliance. China is likely to allege that these incidents have led to a state of war and demand Soviet intervention. If this situation arises, few believe that the war would fail to spread to North Atlantic territory.

No Western European nation is ready for war. Western European nations together cannot now stop a Soviet attack and they will not be ready for at least two years, and then only if they agree among themselves to an effective and coordinated program. If the USSR attacks before

completion of this task, most Allies expect to be defeated and if they resist, to be treated (or mistreated) as collaborators of the United States. They would get better terms and less destruction to their homelands if they yield without resistance. Consequently there is strong sentiment to appease China, and if necessary abandon the Alliance, rather than risk war which would, at this time, mean their abject defeat.

The foregoing ideas are those of a minority. Unlike the United States, governments in Europe may change overnight; not infrequently do so.


**Developments.** As this account closes there has been no decision as to rearming West Germany. France has modified her previous stand that no units larger than a regiment be permitted in Germany. She will now agree to regimental combat teams. The Allied High Commissioners have prodded West Germany to prepare to fight within the North Atlantic Alliance. Germans have shown little enthusiasm.

The American view is that a division composed of the combined arms is the only one useful in modern war. Smaller units may be used for guard duty in rear areas, but they are incapable of independent action in line. Regimental combat teams of mixed nationality do not make an efficient division. France, at a critical period, has materially delayed the formation of a West European army.

#### CHINA

China's propaganda, press and radio, has been bitterly anti-American. First movement of Chinese troops into Korea reported was on 14 October since when the movement has been continuous. As previously reported in this column, 15 divisions of various army groups commenced to assemble opposite Korea in July, with the USSR undertaking to equip them with late-model matériel. It is now known that additional divisions mostly, but not exclusively, from the Chinese 4th Army Group have been concentrating in Manchuria. This army group was in southeast China. Despatches from Hong Kong report that the tail of this command cleared Canton on 16 November, proceeding by rail for Manchuria. About a month seems to be needed for this journey.

Including reinforcing troops the 4th Army Group believed to have assumed command in Manchuria has the following armies (Chinese army is a



*The story of the Korean war in maps. (From The New York Times)*

three-division corps—about 30,000 men) 12th to 17th, 21st, 51st, 53d, 55th to 57th, all inclusive; plus two artillery, three cavalry and one special divisions. The 56th Army has been identified in Korea through POWs.

War preparations have been reported to include:

(1) Mukden and Harbin arsenals are producing ammunition for American artillery and infantry weapons, with which bulk of China troops are equipped. These were captured, or corruptly obtained, in the civil war against the Kuomintang.

(2) Mukden industrial plants are being moved north to Harbin, or south into China.

(3) Travellers from Mukden, including the expelled French Consul, report troops arriving constantly from the south. Soviet dependents, and part of the local population are being evacuated.

On 16 November, President Truman in an effort to avoid war with China announced that the United States had "never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China. We will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of hostilities in the Far East." Next day the Peiping radio ridiculed the President's speech. Placed no credence in him. Claimed it was made to hide hidden American intention. Concluded that "America [the President] had lied; had smashed its way across the world to China territory. China was not deceived by this curtain of lies."

Opinions as expressed in the press, that Chinese intervention in Korea is due to fear of an American invasion, is unsupported by any evidence noted by this writer. Real reason is to drive the Americans and, incidentally, all European nations, out of Asia.

Japan was defeated in World War II. But the Japanese slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" has been adopted as a major political principle by all of Asia.

#### TIBET

Tibet is divided into two sectors: Sitsang (West with capital at Lhasa and a population of three million) and Sikang (East with capital at Kanting and a population of 800,000). The two are united by language and religion, but Sikang has a Chinese civilization. Religion is Lamaism, a variety of Buddhism much respected throughout all Buddhist countries. Consequently invasion of this saintly land has aroused real sympathy.

On 7 October, China attacked claiming it was seeking to "liberate" Tibet from the influence of the capitalist countries, meaning the United States. Tibet has not asked to be liberated; has applied to the United Nations for aid against an unprovoked attack. Main Chinese force reported as five divisions marched westward from Szechwan; secondary force, strength not ascertained, advanced south and southwest from Tsinghai. Each column had about seven hundred miles to go to reach Lhasa, over poor routes, at high altitudes, through destitute country, and with winter approaching. The invaders are armed with U. S. matériel; defenders have no modern equipment and no training—made only a token resistance. As this account closes both invading columns have been stationary since the dates noted above, presumably bogged down by supply difficulties.

The strategic value of Tibet is considerable for a power having control of the air. It has ample locations for airfields, which, however, need to be built. Once this is done planes can fly over most of India, all of Burma, and most of southeast China. Mineral resources are believed to be large, but have not been developed.

India G-2 reports that two Soviet reconnaissance expeditions have been identified operating near Lake Manasarowar, which is about sixty miles north from the Indian boundary. They are reported to have located a site for uranium.

The control of Tibet by the USSR, or through one of its satellites, will form a serious menace to the Western Powers; and a correspondingly important step forward to the incorporation of all of Asia within the Iron Curtain.

#### USSR

The information outlined in the preceding sections confirms earlier reports that for the present main Soviet offensives will be directed to conquest of all of Asia. However, the Politburo which governs the USSR has in the past made sudden changes of policy, and may do so again should favorable opportunities present themselves for an easy occupation of Western Europe.

There is no reliable information as to how far the USSR has progressed with the production of atomic bombs, nor whether she is able to fire atomic shells from guns mounted on submarines, nor on her progress for a bacteriological attack.

A string of air bases, some with underground facilities, protect the Arctic coast from Norway to Bering Strait. Advance bases are on islands farther north, of which Wrangel is the nearest to America. Most of these bases are inaccessible by land, but the sea passage is open for from three to four months each summer. Some of these bases may be for offensive purposes, but in general this appears to be a defensive line to cover against hostile air raids coming over the North Pole.

German reports, partly confirmed from other sources, state that the Soviet 2d Army Group which is opposite Germany has thirty to thirty-five divisions of which six are armored. Armor and motor vehicles are said to be below standard as to upkeep due to lack of technicians, supposedly concentrated in the Far East.

In a major speech at Moscow on 6 November, Marshal Nikolai Bulganin accused the United States and Great Britain with the intent to unleash a new war. He dared them to do it; Russia was prepared. Expressed deep sympathy with Korea; foresaw that the Korean Communists would counterattack and win the war; did not state that the USSR would intervene.

The Cominform, which consists of the Foreign Ministers of Russia and its European satellites plus representatives from the large and active French and Italian Communist Parties, completed a meeting at Prague on 21 October. Some secret decisions, not yet known, seem to have been made. Officially the only subject discussed was Germany. The USSR later communicated the results in identical letters to the United States, Great Britain and France.

Soviet proposals regarding Germany:

(1) Prevent remilitarization or her being dragged into aggressive plans.

(2) Prevent war potential, but permit development of a peaceful economy.

(3) An immediate peace treaty with a united Germany; followed by withdrawal of occupation forces within one year thereafter.

(4) Appoint a "balanced East and West German constitutional council" to prepare for creating a "peace loving" government.

France has expressed a willingness to debate these propositions, but the United States and Great Britain do not approve of this.

# TO THE EDITORS

## "I Have Led a Squad in Combat"

To the Editors:

Perhaps it is irregular to publish part of a letter received from a serviceman, but I would like to offer for your approval the following which I received from Sergeant John P. Wooden, RA 16246112, EUSAK, PIO, APO 301, San Francisco, a former employee of this newspaper and now a writer for *Stars & Stripes* in Korea.

I should like to quote a portion of Sergeant Wooden's recent letter to me from Korea.

"... one thing, though, that a civilian would never understand, but I think you will. Even if I am a total failure as a civilian, I will have one claim to fame—a claim that can never be taken from me, and that is this—I have led an infantry squad in combat. As I say, a civilian will never understand what that means. He couldn't begin to realize, but I will be proud of that feat as long as I live, and I wouldn't trade the infantry for any of the "glamor" services, because it just can't be beat. *Sloggers never die, they just pass from the scene. But as long as there is a single man someplace in the world, lying on his belly in the mud, with a rifle cradled in his arms, they can't die. They don't dare!!!*"

As an ex-infantryman myself, I think the italicized portion of the quote is a great tribute to the infantryman, and so send it to you.

I have been getting the JOURNAL for some seven or eight years and earnestly hope to subscribe again. It is still enjoyable reading and now that it has been combined with the other combat services it keeps us posted on everything going on as far as the "team" is concerned.

A. J. KIEKBUSCH

Winona Republican-Herald  
Winona, Minnesota

## "A Single Team of Battle"

To the Editors:

The editorial, "Korea: A Single Team of Battle," which appears in the November 1950 issue of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a fine example of a balanced editorial opinion, and I take this opportunity to compliment you and the members of your editorial staff.

I share your earnest hope that "no unpleasant arguments over combat credit will follow the Korean War." Admittedly, little would be gained by such wrangling. Your pointed acknowledgment of the contribution made by each service to

the prosecution of the overall campaign in Korea is impressive. I am most appreciative of your warm tribute to the Marine Corps and Marines.

My personal best wishes for much success in the creditable undertaking as outlined in your November 1950 editorial.

GENERAL C. B. CATES

Commandant USMC  
Hq. U.S. Marine Corps  
Washington 25, D. C.

To the Editors:

The new COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a journal that since its first issue has contained many interesting articles on various subjects that we in the armed forces can benefit by reading. It is a means of presenting the latest news and developments to the officers and enlisted men.

Before the merging of the two journals into one I subscribed to *The Field Artillery Journal* for seven years. During this time it kept me abreast of the latest changes in artillery tactics, gunnery, survey and a variety of other subjects. Since the artillery is a highly technical branch of the armed forces it is important that the technical changes be made known to the artillery units as soon as possible for them to function properly. One of the best means for dissemination of this information was *The Field Artillery Journal*. I am looking forward eagerly to seeing these technical articles on the artillery appear in the new COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL.

MAJ. JOHN J. KAVANAUGH

Field Artillery

Hq 980th FA BN, 40th Inf Div.  
Camp Cooke, Calif.

• We are in close touch with the Artillery Center at Fort Sill and they are cooperating in every way to provide us with good artillery articles. We have several on hand that will appear in early issues.

## No Peashooter

To the Editors:

For the information of Lieutenant A. F. Brant (November issue) and all concerned, "the peashooter known as the carbine" is a damned fine military weapon in the hands of a trained infantryman.

The carbine was not designed as a new and revolutionary type of weapon. It was designed to replace the pistol. Consider the mission of the designers and the officials who gave it the stamp of approval and it is obvious that a wise decision was made. Still in doubt? Compare the pis-

tol and carbine scores of the average recruit who has had an equal amount of training with both weapons.

From an economic and logistical point of view, to attempt to convert the carbine to .357 Magnum at this time would be an absurdity. We have a great many caliber .30 carbines on hand now. So do some of our allies. How much would it cost to collect and convert these weapons—if it is possible at all? Personally, I agree with the Lieutenant's belief in exchanging ideas. I'd like an 81mm mortar shell with an atomic warhead. It would be useful, to say the least. But right now we have to make the best possible use of what is on hand. So much for economy and logistics. Now, what about that "peashooter" remark?

Ballistically the carbine is hardly a "peashooter." No weapon in the handgun class (again, it was designed to replace the pistol) that will deliver a 110-grain slug effectively at three hundred yards can be called that. The muzzle velocity of the carbine is 2,000 feet per second—as compared to about 800 feet per second for the .45 pistol. Add selectivity—semiautomatic or automatic fire, adjustable sights, a grenade launcher, and a bayonet. Our ordnance people simply gave us a light, souped-up handgun with a rifle stock to increase accuracy.

It's not the weapons designers who are at fault so much as it is the people responsible for training men to shoot with accuracy and confidence.

Maybe you say, "Men, this is a 'peashooter' known as the carbine." And there goes to hell the man's incentive to learn to use a good weapon; his confidence in the people who design our weapons; and his faith in our tactical commanders who must decide whether or not a weapon is effective. It is morally wrong to put a recruit under any such mental handicap—to deliberately destroy his faith in his weapons and his leaders.

Don't do that! Show your men the carbine (and all of our other equipment) in its true light. Teach them to use it for all it is worth with the aggressiveness and confidence is a requisite to success in battle.

M/Sgt. FRANK L. BROWN

Infantry

State Teachers College  
Clarion, Pa.

## New Warfare

To the Editors:

(You have my permission to publish the following letter as you requested.)

I received your letter with my returned manuscript, "The Rifle's Place in War," last night and was flattered to note that it stirred up some violent discussion in your staff. That is doing well for a mere civilian. I also note that the officers who were in the last war were the most violently opposed to it. That was to be expected. They were the most exposed to,

and the worst afflicted by, the massed force psychosis.

It seems to me that there is a dangerous fallacy in modern American military thought, so far as I am able to apprehend it, not being in the confidence of the General Staff. My rifle article was inspired by that conviction but was limited because I am not in possession of the technical data necessary for a rounded discussion.

The fallacy is that World War III, which I believe, barring revolution in Russia, is inevitable, can be won with great massed attacks, such as the Normandy landing and to a lesser degree, the Inchon action. There has been talk of using the atomic bomb against troop concentrations and of artillery shells with atomic warheads. Neither Normandy or Inchon could have been undertaken had they been opposed by possibility of an atomic bomb. The Soviet has vast manpower at her disposal and cares nothing for human life. The USSR has the initiative and will start the war when the Kremlin thinks they can win. The Soviet will try to destroy and disrupt our highly integrated and much too vulnerable industrial power, probably with a sneak attack, and then force us to fight in as many different places and over the widest possible fronts that they can devise. They can lose three or four men to our one and still win, or at any rate, that is a possibility we must prepare for.

The great mass attacks of the last war were justified by the conditions then existing. My contention is that in the next war such concentrations of power will be too dangerous to risk. I expect the armies to fight in depth and well dispersed. Combat will have many aspects of guerrilla warfare. I have no objection to massed rifle fire when the target justifies it. But I most certainly think that the rifleman should not be a mere Brown Bess musketeer but a marksman who can efficiently knock out individual targets when presented.

The Army offers an attractive career for brilliant and able men who are able to consecrate their lives before the altar of military orthodoxy. It is a very poor place for men who look forward instead of backward; who express doubts and ask pointed questions; and who sense that the only unalterable law in this universe of ours is the law of eternal and endless change.

The Army crucified its prophet of the last war, Mitchell, and then had to swallow his revelations whole. The Army does not need to crucify me. It will be cheaper and safer to ignore me and forget that the German General Staff advised its generals in the field that American troops were helpless in forests.

I may be a fool, but even a fool can worry about a military set-up that spends ninety-five billions on defense and then gets caught with its pants down by a

bunch of troops from the north half of a country no larger than Florida. When Uncle Joe throws down his hand it ain't going to be for peanuts.

DON MARTIN

P. O. Box 207

Salmon, Idaho

- We wish more citizens of the country would take this much serious interest in Army problems.

We'll take exception to only one statement here. If Mr. Martin could read the entire court-martial record of the trial of General Mitchell, we think he would agree that he was guilty as charged. It was the manner in which he acted in promoting his ideas, not the ideas themselves that got him into trouble. And as far whether the Army now has people who look forward and ask questions, we will simply refer to the article in our December issue on LOGEX 1950, entitled "Logistics: Dispersion & Decision."

\* \* \*

#### Combat Pay

To the Editors:

In today's *Washington Post* Drew Pearson speaks up for the lowly Doughboy. It is heartening to know that someone in public life has guts enough to speak his mind of the raw deal the front-line soldiers are getting. When is the Army going to "give fair play and recognition to the foot soldiers who did the slugging and the slogging?"

A year ago when the pay bill went through all the Infantryman got was a vague promise of future consideration of his combat pay. Has that promise been forgotten? A radio speaker the other day reminded us not to forget the dead who gave us our victory over communism in Korea. Let us not forget the living either—the soldier and his family. A small recompense for their sacrifice would be the same pay for "hazardous duty" that our airmen receive—retroactive to June 25, 1950, and paid in full to each soldier (or his heirs) who fought in the front lines in Korea. To those who would object (and rumor has it there are some in the Air Force) let us ask: "Is four hours of flying per month equivalent to thirty days of fighting with a rifle and bayonet? Should one man sleep between sheets every night and draw 'hazard' pay while another sleeps in stinking mud not knowing which second will be his last for days on end and draws the lowest pay on the scale?"

The answers to these questions lie with the people of our country. Will those who perform dangerous and arduous duty be rewarded in a fitting manner? Will those who shirk be punished? If the people answer "No," our infantrymen will be the weaklings, the misfits, and the psychos. If those who determine our Nation's policy don't stand up and fight this battle for the infantryman, then how

can they expect the infantryman to push forward and fight?

Before I again volunteer my services to command troops I want to know what the Army is going to do about this sorry situation.

LT. COL. JAMES N. PEALE, JR.  
868 Monticello Drive  
Falls Church, Va.

- When we were going to press there seemed to be a good chance that there would be action on this matter—about 30 years late.

\* \* \*

#### The Soldier's Load

To THE EDITORS:

As an aviation engineer who took part in the North Africa invasion as an infantryman, I was interested in the recent article on the load of the soldier. The discussion relative to mobility of the ground soldier brought to mind the following excerpt from the book, *Wellington's Men*, a compilation of soldiers' memoirs of the Napoleonic Wars.

"The weight I myself toiled under was tremendous and I often wonder at the strength I possessed at this period, which enabled me to endure it; for indeed, I am convinced that many of our infantry sank and died under the weight of their knapsacks alone. For my own part, being a handicraft, I marched under a weight sufficient to impede the free motions of a donkey! for besides my well filled kit, there was the greatcoat rolled on its top, my blanket and camp kettle, my haversack, stuffed full of leather for repairing the men's shoes, together with a hammer and other tools (the lap stone I took the liberty of flinging to the devil), ship biscuit and beef for three days.

"I also carried my canteen filled with water, my hatchet and rifle and eighty rounds of ball cartridge in my pouch; this last, except the beef and biscuit being the best thing I owned, and which I always gave the enemy the benefit of when opportunity offered.

"Altogether the quantity of things I had on my shoulders was enough and more than enough for my wants, sufficient, indeed, to sink a little fellow of five feet, seven inches into the earth. Nay, so awkwardly was the load our men bore in those days placed upon their backs, that the free motion of the body was impeded, the head held down from the pile at the back of the neck, and the soldier half beaten before he came to the scratch."

From the foregoing excerpt from *Rifleman Harris*, it would seem that the load of the foot soldier, has posed a problem from earliest times down to the present. It is interesting to see that someone is now working toward a solution of this problem.

EDMUND K. STILES

15 Page Road  
Newtonville, Mass.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## Realistic Criticism

DEFENCE OF THE WEST. By B. H. Liddell Hart. William Morrow & Company. 335 pages; Index; \$4.00.

If you expect to find in Liddell Hart's latest book the complete blueprint for the Supreme Commander of NATO to follow in the defense of Western Europe, you will be disappointed. The book's title belies its substance. It is mostly a miscellany of views previously developed by Liddell Hart in former books and articles and loosely tied to the theme of Western security.

*Defence of the West* is an interesting adventure nonetheless. Many of Hart's basic arguments gain validity by this present reiteration and all of them are written in the lucid, arresting manner which long ago placed their author in the first rank of military writers. Besides, the careful reader can extract from this varied array of chapters a number of concepts upon which a defense of Western Europe could be planned.

The book begins with a section entitled, "Riddles of the Immediate Past." An expanded examination of some phases of World War II would have benefited the author's avowed aim. In view of the widespread fear of possible Communist fifth column action in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe Hart's claim that the importance of Nazi-inspired treachery to the success of the 1940 German campaign was "immensely exaggerated" calls for further development. Even more tantalizing is the short morsel Hart inserted concerning a successful defensive pattern the German General Heinrichi devised to stop a series of massed Soviet offensives in late 1943. Heinrichi employed ten German divisions on a hundred-mile front to check five successive assaults launched within a two-month period. The Soviets threw an average of over thirty divisions into these attacks to no avail. The Germans successfully defended a sector about one-fourth the width of the Alps-North Sea line with about the same miles per division frontages as have been suggested

for western Europe. The tactics employed by the German army commander in this instance merit the study of every allied planner.

In turning to "Riddles of the Immediate Future" Hart provides a formula of strong tactical air forces (to "be met by large scale and early provision from the USA") plus twenty high-quality divisions as "the minimum scale necessary to check the Russian spearheads." Here and elsewhere in the book is an explicit recognition of America's place as the bulwark of the Western Alliance. Yet Hart does not appear happy over the necessary reliance of Europe on America. In a counter excursion into politics he urges a European union as a step to improve security, and chides the Labor Government's extreme caution over the project. Hart reflects the prevalent Continental pessimism in reaffirming the belief that "ultimate victory in another war would bring little consolation to the countries of Western Europe," especially if the war involved a liberation phase.

Perhaps the same mood inspires the author's insistence on Britain's undertaking an elaborate program of civil defense. In terms of effort and in relation to other essential defense "musts" Hart's civil defense program is "fantastic, yet to plan anything less would be trifling with the problem of national survival."

The book's survey of Soviet military forces contains the interesting speculation that the USSR did not exploit her airborne forces during the last conflict because she was saving them for the big game "with America and Britain, for the control of Western Europe." This contention is at variance (especially in light of the aggression in Korea) with the author's admonition for us "to curb our irritation" with the Soviet's "aggressive attitude," because of the "underlying desire for peace among a people who have suffered so much from War." Evidently, this desire has not seeped up to the Politburo.

Current military problems, although concentrated in one specific section, are also emphasized throughout the book. Especially is this true

of Hart's campaign to eliminate conscription as a means of raising the armies of the democratic West. Hart argues that conscription dilutes the qualities of a professional army and, because it absorbs so many regular troops in training, it actually cuts down the number of first-line operational units. This concept is, of course, diametrically opposite to the official U.S. policy of small standing forces backed by large civilian reserves, but it nevertheless merits careful scrutiny. Nor can Hart's arguments for an organic blending of the three services into one be lightly dismissed, both as a means of avoiding triplication and of curtailing the military waste of manpower.

It is a pity that the chapter on the future of armor did not take into account the dynamic impact of the shaped-charge shell on the Korean battlefields. It may have modified Hart's flat dismissal of the projectile-vs-tank argument so recently reopened by the war in the Far East. Yet, however American armor develops as the result of Korean experience, Hart's principle of cross-country or "locomobility" should be applied to all of our divisions.

To any one who has suffered frustration from the inevitable delays in the transmission of orders down the many rungs of the command ladder, the transmission of orders down the plify the military system of control come as a breath of fresh air. This subject should not be left to the organizational experts on "the span of control" but should become a topic of professional study and experimental trial.

Junior officers will be pleased with the recognition Hart gives their role in the modern military nature of things, as will civilian soldiers with Hart's plea for a greater appreciation of their potential contribution to the services.

The end of the book is devoted to some ideas on qualitative disarmament and on the limitation of war of which the author has long been a champion. It does not detract from their merits to assert that they do not appear practical in the present tense political climate. But given a real spirit toward peace in the minds of all the world's leaders they could provide a starting point for a sounder security than that which can be obtained by armed might.

For the present, the tactical and organizational ideas so ably advanced by Liddell Hart offer a more realistic

## OFF-DUTY READING

## CAREER BOOKS

THIS is probably a good time to explain what we're trying to do with the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL Basic Military Library, Part II of which you'll find on the back cover of this issue. While it is true that these are advertisements — hence designed to sell books—they are also the product of long thought on the part of the staff.

We don't suggest that every officer or noncom should buy every one of these books as we list them, but we do say that every man who is making the Army his career will at some time in his span of professional service need to read nearly all of them. We leave to your good judgment which books you will need, and when.

However, nobody here pretends to be all-knowing. Surely many of you have books you feel should be added to the list in the future—books of enduring value. I'd appreciate your sending in your nominations to this department so that the staff can read them if we have not done so already, discuss them, and perhaps add them to the Basic Military Library. Sorry we can't make a contest of this, but our supply of yachts is completely exhausted.

Several hundred books have been published since I last wrote this column. The only explanation I can think of for this phenomenon is that every book—like every child—has a mother who loves it. A few of them turn out to be worthy of the love bestowed upon them.

My nomination for this month's standout is Dr. Ferdinand C. Lane's magnificent *The Story of Mountains* (Doubleday, \$6.50). Here is that rare book of fact by a man so thoroughly, unobtrusively competent that you can read it with complete enjoyment and then discover happily that you have learned a great deal about mountains. Here are the origins of mountains, their structure and vegetation; their impact on man and his way of life, their varying characteristics, legends that have grown up around them, and the mountaineers who have attacked them. Even if you

don't read the book, the illustrations are worth more than the price of the whole shooting match.

We now move from mountains to Indians—in this case, Massai, Paul Wellman's *Broncho Apache* (Doubleday, \$8.00). In the past Paul Wellman has written magnificent history in his *Death on the Prairie*, *Death on the Desert*, and *The Trampling Herd*, and this book—though it is admittedly fiction—is based on what is known of Massai's life. When Massai, the Apache Warrior, escaped from the prison train carrying Geronimo to Florida exile, his way home took him over half a continent, only to find himself betrayed by one of his own race. Again he escaped, and began a lone, savage war against two civilized nations. This book is his story, and the story of his war—a brilliant characterization of one of the last of a breed that is gone.

Occasionally we overlook in these pages a book that should nowhere be overlooked. Such a book is Guthrie Wilson's *Brave Company* (Putnam, \$3.00). It is a novel by a New Zealander—an infantryman who saw long service in Italy. Sensitive and mature, Wilson has caught the feeling of the foot soldier's war, and the strange comradeship that exists in a small unit as few men have ever caught it.

From the tragedy of a squad to the tragedy of our time is not such a step, for one is the product of the other. One of the great chroniclers of the passing of an era—the ordered, harmonious past—was Ford Madox Ford. In *Parade's End* (Knopf, \$5.00) Ford tells the story of Christopher Tietjens, "the last English Tory," and the passing of all the things that such a man stood for. The development of Tietjens' personality in his journey from the past into the future—in time only the brief years of World War I—is a tremendous accomplishment of writing. Here is a book that is difficult to read and to digest but tremendously rewarding.

O. C. S.

contribution to the defense of the West.—LT. COL. WILLIAM R. KINTNER.

## British War History

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By Strategicus. Faber & Faber. 345 pages; Maps; index; \$4.50.

In this short history of World War II, the well known British military writer, "Strategicus," has tried to give a complete survey of the war and at the same time concentrate attention of "the purpose of all wars, the removal of those conditions which brought it about." The result while pleasing to some will be certain to arouse protest on this side of the Atlantic. As a feat of condensation, his achievement in covering six years of global war in less than three hundred pages of text is a remarkable one. To bridge the gaps and help the reader understand what is happening around the globe, the author has provided a 45-page chronology. What distinguishes his effort in the mind of the author from other histories of the war is the treatment he gives to "the astonishing difference between West and East as to the importance of the political end of the war as the final determinant of strategy."

In other words, "Strategicus" thinks that although President Roosevelt was remarkably quick to grasp the menace of Axis aggression he had little or no comprehension of the political ends of the war. His military and naval advisers, the author feels, faithfully reflected Roosevelt's weakness in this field. On the other hand, the British from Churchill down had a clear-eyed vision of the political implications of strategy. General Eisenhower, dismissed in these pages with scant praise, is singled out as a most flagrant example of the non-political-mindedness of American military leaders. Marshall and Stimson, he claims, always supported Eisenhower in his primary concern for purely military ends. Against this combination British political wisdom in oral and written form could not prevail. Eisenhower went ahead and won the war militarily in such a way as to insure its loss politically. If I can read the English language that is the main thesis of this book.

What "Strategicus" wanted Eisenhower to do was call off the invasion of southern France and send those forces into the northern Adriatic to

outflank the German positions in Italy. General Eisenhower should also have placed all the resources of the allied armies behind Montgomery for that much talked of "full-blooded" advance on a narrow front into Germany in the autumn of 1944. He should also have maneuvered the Allied armies in such a way as to take Berlin, and to have occupied the Balkans and southeastern Europe.

All this is written as if "Strategicus" and the British were certain in 1944-45 that unless all of central and southeastern Europe were occupied and garrisoned by Allied troops at the end of hostilities, Communist aggression was certain to follow. It is well to remember that from 1941 to 1944 British leaders acted as if they anticipated a certain amount of Big Three unity after the war. If their leaders were then certain that the USSR was going to carry out the aggressive steps she has since 1945, the Western Allies would have been well advised to adopt *at that time* the Goebbels-Hitler concept of an Axis-Allied crusade against Communism. Failing this they should have been prepared to help push the Soviet out of central and southeastern Europe by force of arms if necessary after VE-day.

Does any reader imagine that there would be less tension in the world at present if the Allies had conducted their major campaigns in Europe with the military objective of defeating the Germans subordinate to the political objective of checkmating the Soviets? I hardly think so.

Some of the inaccuracies in this history are a little surprising. The author (page 210) has Eisenhower promoted to the rank of brigadier instead of major general in March 1941 when he took over the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff—what "Strategicus" calls that "United States Headquarters." He believes that if the Germans could have delayed the Allied invasion of Normandy for a few months (page 214) it would be impossible to predict how the war might have gone for, he writes, "considerable progress had been made with nuclear fission"—presumably in Germany. This statement is at variance with Professor Goudsmit's book, *Alsos*, which shows that nuclear fission had made remarkably little progress in Germany up to 1944. The author has Himmler taking charge of German affairs late in April of 1945, something that never happened. The "Red Ball" truck route is set down as the "Red Balls!"

"Strategicus" has no reservations about reporting Soviet estimates of German losses or of British estimates of Japanese losses in Burma, but he gently chides General MacArthur (page 247) for his estimate of Japanese losses in the Philippines. Nevertheless "Strategicus" greatly admires General MacArthur and places him ahead of all other American field or theater commanders. General Bradley he does not rank at all—which is rather strange considering his estimate of General Brereton.

Perhaps the best feature of this history is the coverage given to Red Army operations against the Wehrmacht from 1942 to 1945. Though his repeated reference to one place name after another becomes rather meaningless, the broad picture of events in the East which he sketches is an impressive one. There is no indication, however, that the author has used any sources other than Red Army communiqués and press reports.—H. A. DEWEERD.

#### **Snatch on the Brass**

**ILL MET BY MOONLIGHT.** By W. Stanley Moss. The Macmillan Company. 192 Pages; Illustrated; \$2.50.

It's not often that combat soldiers have a hell of a good time during field operations, but the group of Cretans and Englishmen, who set out to capture the commander of the German forces in Crete, had just that during the course of the magnificent adventure.

This book has everything—secret agents, black-turbaned partisans, hairbreadth escapes, silly mistakes that almost cost lives, and above all, high good humor and excitement.

On April 26, 1944, Major General Karl Kreipe, commander of the German forces in Crete, left his headquarters for his villa a short distance away. But the General never made it. He was kidnapped, dumped in the bottom of a car and driven through twenty-two control posts, while an Englishman, wearing his hat, received full salutes from the guards.

Then followed the chase, with the whole German garrison in Crete beating every inch of the island while the General and his captors skipped from hiding place to hiding place. The pickup by boat failed several times, but the crew finally landed their captive in Egypt.

As exuberant as it is exciting, *Ill Met By Moonlight* should be long remembered by every lover of vivid

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## Classic

NAPOLEON'S MEMOIRS. Edited by Somerset de Chair. Harper & Brothers. 605 Pages; Maps; Index; \$7.50.

The only known edition of Napoleon's memoirs to appear in English was published in London in 1823, and has been out of print for more than a century. That edition was in seven volumes; the result of Napoleon's system of dictating portions of the work to four different aides, each of whom published the portion he recorded. The result was duplication, overlapping, and general confusion. De Chair, author among other books of *The Golden Carpet*, the highly readable account of his adventures in the Iraqi desert during World War II, has combined the previous seven volumes into one continuous narrative in Napoleon's own words. There is a minimum of interpolated material; merely that necessary to assist the reader who is not a Napoleonic expert.

The book covers Napoleon's life from the early days to Marengo; there is a gap from Marengo to the Hundred Days, since the Emperor died before he could complete the project.

There can be no honest appraisal of De Chair's editing unless the reviewer had the original seven-volume work in hand—which this reviewer doesn't. The text appears to be complete, chronological and clear. The price may appear to be a trifle steep, but there are a half-million words here, of a book that will appeal primarily to historical specialists and military students. The limited circulation precludes the economies of mass production. Any reader who wants the book will pay the \$7.50 price.—A. S.

## Sound Comment

SWORD AND PEN. By Major-General A. C. Duff. Gale & Polden. 108 pages; \$2.00.

The British are on occasion better military writers than Americans. *Sword and Pen* is a collection of ten delightfully written essays, on subjects such as "The Shortage of Officers," "The Shortage of Recruits," "The Problems of Organization," "Professional Competence," etc. The General's ability to say what has to

be said, and to say it without being offensive or disparaging, is of the highest order. He looks forward without forgetting the past. Particularly sound is his realization that changed conditions in the nation as a whole bring changed conditions in the military forces, but that tradition has its place also.

One passage, from "The Shortage of Recruits," too long to quote, touches upon a point that brings grave concern also to many American officers. Writing of the tendency to popularize the services by granting enlisted men more freedom off duty, with the result that very little spare time is spent in barracks, the General says: "This is dangerous. The corporate life of a unit is not nourished only during the hours spent on parade; it derives much of its sustenance from off-parade activities—games, amusement, recreation of every sort. It is during those hours that men get to know each other and the officers get to know their men. Activities of that kind are now dying, and the unit is tending to approximate to a factory, a place where men spend their working hours and from which they disappear as soon as their working hours are over . . . the degree of cohesion and the attitude of mind of factory hands are not good enough for members of the Armed Forces of the Crown . . ."

That's it, here as well as there. Even General Duff does not offer a solution.

Combat men of any army will enjoy the essay "The Teeth and the Tail." Here is the eternal quarrel between the cutting edge and the rear-area boys reduced to gentlemanly terms, but with no punches pulled.

The book is recommended as a literate, thoughtful and good-humored discussion of the problems of today's army. It is too bad that it was not written about our own forces.—A. S.

#### **Maybe There's Hope**

**WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESS.**  
By John U. Nef. Harvard University Press. 415 pages; Index: \$6.50.

For many years John U. Nef, Professor of Economic History at the University of Chicago, has been concerned with the relationship between Western civilization and warfare. The present book consists of a series of scholarly essays on various aspects of that subject some of which were previously published in journals. His objective is to present a synthesis of in-

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dustrial, cultural, and military history from about A.D. 1500 to the present. The most striking feature of his earlier chapters is the case he makes to prove that it was not war, but the limitations imposed by European culture and religion on war, which made possible the industrial revolution and the ultimate industrialization of the western world.

In the second half of his book Professor Neff traces the gradual breakdown of the restraints imposed on war in earlier periods by the moral imperatives of the Christian faith and by the medieval habits of craftsmanship which put elegance before utility. When machine civilization made possible an economy of abundance, it also made possible the mass production of weapons. In these circumstances wars became increasingly total.

It is natural that in his summary chapters Professor Neff views the present and future with mingled foreboding and hope. Of the dilemma in which our civilization has placed us he writes:

"The only justification for war is the defense of a culture worth defending, and the states of the modern world have less and less to defend beyond their material comforts. The new weapons have made nonsense of defensive war. Peoples have no means of defending except by destroying others, and the destruction is almost certain to be mutual. . . ."

To mitigate the evils of future wars, Professor Neff looks forward to the creation of a community of understanding relating to life as a whole such as existed in earlier centuries and effectively limited the ravages of war. The author is wise enough to realize that such a community of understanding cannot be created quickly. He believes, however, that man is not without power to determine his own destiny. In harnessing the best intellectual, moral and religious impulses of mankind to the objectives of a new universalism Professor Neff sees the best hope for man's future. This is a scholarly, introspective analysis, hard to read and harder to digest. Thirty pages of footnotes attest the soundness of the author's research.—H. A. DEWEERD.

### Unusual Unit History

**THE BLACK WATCH—AND THE KING'S ENEMIES.** By Bernard Ferguson. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 384 pages; maps; index. The dealings of the Black Watch—

the Royal Highland Regiment—with the King's enemies run from 1739. Since the King has had many enemies in the last 200 years, there are few spots in the world where these dreaded Jocks have not fought. In the past war alone they were in the original fighting in Belgium which ended at Dunkirk; the disaster at Saint-Valery in the final French debacle; Somaliland, Crete, the defense of Tobruk, in the Middle East; at Gibraltar; the conquest of North Africa from El Alemein to Tripoli; the capture of Sicily; the Italian campaigns; Normandy; the crossing of the Rhine; the incursion of the Chindits behind the Japanese lines in Burma.

This record alone would warrant a history, and a reading by anyone interested in military affairs. When this record is magnificently written, with a fierce yet modest pride; with some delightful dead-pan humor, and with a keen eye for the small details that set off brilliant military operations, it becomes one of the few books, like McMillan's *The Old Breed*, which stand apart from the general run of unit histories.—R. G. McC.

### Secret War Document

**OPERATION CICERO.** By L. C. Moyzisch. Coward-McCann, Inc. 209 pages; \$2.75.

The wartime British Ambassador to Turkey had an Albanian valet. Some years before, the valet's father had been wounded by an Englishman and he hated the English. Seeking revenge he offered to sell the Nazis photographs of top secret British documents for \$75,000 a roll. Labelled Operation Cicero, this deal netted the Albanian valet over a million dollars. Nobody was caught, and in both money and information Operation Cicero wins hands down, so far, as the biggest espionage coup of World War II.

That is the bald story. The author has squeezed the last drop of meller-drammer out of it, but any respectable writer of thrillers would be ashamed to dish it up. There are no cloaks and daggers, no killings, no wild chases, no luscious gals, no real intrigue. In fact, the story is pretty flat—and in truth, most G-2 work is pretty flat and unexciting.

However, between the lines there is plenty of punch, and endless room for fascinating speculation. How come English security was so lax? Why didn't the Nazis make any use at all

of the priceless information they received, information that tipped off every Allied move and conference between 1944 and the end of the war? If the CIA claim (unofficial) is true that they had an agent in German headquarters who would have seen the photographed documents, why didn't he report the leak so it could be stopped? What happened to Cicero, the valet? Nobody apparently knows, despite dark CIA hints. And did Cicero ever learn that most of the sterling notes he received in payment were forged? The author doesn't answer any of these questions. I don't know the answers myself. I sure would like to.—R. G. McC.

### **Top-notch Escape Story**

**THE GREAT ESCAPE.** By Lieutenant Paul Brickhill. W. W. Norton & Company. 264 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.00.

Here is a really top-notch escape story, absolutely one of the best to come out of any war. Unlike that other thriller, *The Wooden Horse*, by Eric Williams, recounting the escape of three men, this exciting yarn tells how some six hundred American and British air force officers worked for a year to prepare for the escape. The work achieved under the constantly prying eyes and the continual surprise searches by the German guards was truly fabulous. Over four hundred passes and other documents were forged; hundreds of compasses were made; thousands of maps prepared; fake German uniforms or civilian clothes were tailored for over two hundred men; there was even a studio for fake passport photos.

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The organization and planning behind work of this magnitude and complexity was stupendous. The leaders were bold, careful, cunning, reckless and magnificently courageous. To tell how they planned and carried out the work, and what success they had, would spoil the story.

*The Great Escape* is a wonderfully exciting yarn of perseverance, ingenuity and courage that for thrills and suspense—even for humor—puts Eric

Ambler and Graham Greene to shame. It's a humdinger!—R. G. McC.

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**FISHING THE SURF.** By Raymond R. Camp. Little, Brown & Company. 224 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$2.50.

**GREAT ORCHESTRAL MUSIC: A TREASURY OF PROGRAM NOTES.** Edited by Julian Seaman. Rinehart & Company, Inc. 476 Pages; \$5.00.

**DON'T SHOOT THE BILL COLLECTOR.** By Preble D. K. Hatch. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 238 Pages; \$3.00. The humorously told trials and tribulations of the man who comes around when you forget to pay your debts.

**THE SUPREME IDENTITY: AN ESSAY ON ORIENTAL METAPHYSIC AND THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.** By Alan W. Watts. Pantheon Books. 204 Pages; Index; \$3.00.

**SEA ROAD TO THE INDIES.** By Henry H. Hart. The Macmillan Company. 296 Pages; Index; \$4.50. A history of the Portuguese mariners of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

**OUR MORE PERFECT UNION.** By Arthur N. Holcombe. Harvard University Press. 460 Pages; Index; \$6.00. A study of the development of the Constitution of the United States in the light of the principles of its founders.

**THE ADVENTURER.** By Mika Waltari. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 377 Pages; \$3.50. A new novel by the author of *The Egyptian*.

**BRAVE COMPANY.** By Guthrie Wilson. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 246 Pages; \$3.00.

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**JOURNEY TO THE "MISSOURI": A JAPANESE DIPLOMAT'S STORY OF HOW HIS COUNTRY MADE WAR AND PEACE.** By Toshikazu Kase. Yale University Press. 282 Pages; Index; \$4.00.

**THE THOUSAND DEATHS OF MR. SMALL.** By Gerald Kersh. Doubleday & Company. 377 Pages; \$3.50. A bitter picture of an individual struggling to defy the family pattern.

**YOUNG MAN OF PARIS.** By Henri Calet; Translated from the French by Jacques Le Clercq. E. P. Dutton & Company. 256 Pages; \$3.00. A penetrating memoir of life in Paris by a Parisienne.

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